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This thesis is about designing wireless mission data transfer system for the Finnish
Air Force’s Grob 115E elementary training aircraft. This thesis explains the use case
of the mission data system, and how the wireless implementation for the mission
data transfer would change the operation. The target was to design a system that
is capable of transferring data wirelessly between the ground station and the Grob
aircraft.
The biggest challenge for the implementation was the vast amount of data that was
needed to be transferred from the aircraft to the ground station after the flight. Also,
the time window during which the transfer had to be completed was very limited.
Two WLAN standards, IEEE’s 802.11ac and 802.11ax were considered as potential
techniques to implement the wireless connectivity. In this thesis the WLAN security
was also examined, and two additional methods outside of WLAN standards were
suggested for gaining better security for the data transmission.
Wireless system utilizing the 802.11ac standard was tested and OpenSSH and
OpenVPN were examined as potential techniques to strengthen the communication
security. The results showed that the 802.11ac standard performs well with the
communication distances of the wireless mission data transfer system. 802.11ac
however has one drawback that highly diminishes its potential as the communication
standard for the wireless mission data transfer system. 802.11ac doesn’t perform well
enough, if there are multiple clients simultaneously transferring data. The newest
802.11ax standard is not yet fully released, but its potential can be recognized, and
it will fix the drawbacks of 802.11ac. On the whole, WLAN standards are suitable
for implementing the wireless mission data system, if the level of security is identified
as sufficient.
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Tämä diplomityö käsittelee langattoman tehtävädatansiirtojärjestelmän suunnittelua
Suomen Ilmavoimien Grob 115E-alkeiskoulutuskoneeseen. Työssä käydään läpi teh-
täväjärjestelmän käyttötarkoitus ja kuinka tehtävädatansiirtojärjestelmän langaton
toteutus tulisi muuttamaan tehtäväjärjestelmän käyttöä. Tavoitteena oli suunni-
tella järjestelmä, joka mahdollistaa langattoman datansiirron maajärjestelmän ja
Grob-lentokoneen välillä.
Suurimpana haasteena toteutukselle oli datan suuri määrä, mikä tulisi siirtää lan-
gattomasti lennon jälkeen. Aikaikkuna, jonka sisällä tiedonsiirron tulisi tapahtua
on myös hyvin rajallinen. Kaksi WLAN standardia, IEEE:n 802.11ac ja 802.11ax
otettiin tarkempaan tarkasteluun mahdollisina tekniikkoina langattoman tiedonsiir-
ron toteuttamiseksi. Työssä tarkastellaan myös langattoman lähiverkon tietoturvaa
ja ehdotetaan kahta menetelmää, joiden avulla tiedonsiirron turvallisuutta voitai-
siin parantaa. Työssä testattiin langatonta siirtojärjestelmää joka hyödynsi IEEE:n
802.11ac standardia.
Tulosten perusteella 802.11ac standardi sopii hyvin langattomaan tiedonsiirtoon
testatuilla etäisyyksillä. 802.11ac kärsii kuitenkin yhdestä vajaavaisuudesta, joka
heikentää sen käytettävyyttä tämän työn tarkoitukseen. 802.11ac:n suorituskyky ei
ole riittävä, jos usea verkon jäsen lähettää dataa samanaikaisesti. 802.11ax standardia
ei ole vielä täysin julkaistu, mutta sen potentiaali on tunnistettavissa ja se tulee
korjaamaan 802.11ac:n heikkoudet tämän työn käyttötarkoituksessa. Yhteenvetona
WLAN standardit ovat käyttökelpoisia langattoman tiedonsiirron toteuttamiseen,
mikäli tietoturvan tason todetaan olevan riittävä.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Radio technologies have been widely used in aviation industry for many decades.
Radios have been used e.g for communication, navigation and altitude measurement.
In addition to these flight critical systems, modern aircraft carriers have even begun
to oﬀer wireless Internet connections for the passengers during the flight. All of the
previously mentioned applications rely on radio frequencies.
Digitalization, Internet of Things (IoT) and ubiquitous networking are trends that
are gaining more and more attention every year. It is inevitable that these kind of
trends are gaining footing also in well established industries such as aviation and
defence. Usually the adoption of new technologies is much slower in these industries.
Modern wireless communication technologies oﬀer a possibility to connect massive
number of users and also to transfer data at high rates. Usually technologies have to
compromise between the number of users and the data rates, as the radio frequency
resources are limited. As the number of mobile phones and other smart devices has
become so large, the wireless connection between the devices and the Internet has
become self-evident and often it’s not even considered.
In this thesis, a wireless mission data transfer system for the Finnish Air Force’s
(FINAF) Grob aircraft fleet is proposed. Here the mission data system consists of
a data recorder, that is used to record data from the flight. This data recorder in
question must not be mixed with a so called ”black box”, which is a term used for
data recorders in civil airliners. Black boxes are designed to survive crashes and the
recorded data is used to analyze the causes that might have led to the crash. In
the Grob platform, recorded data is used to analyze the training mission after the
flight. The data recorder in the Grob platform can also be used to bring data from
the pre-flight brief to the aircraft. The data could include e.g waypoints that can be
used to make the training mission more eﬀective. The wireless part of the mission
data transfer system should include transferring the briefing data to the aircraft
before the mission, and also transferring the recorded data from the aircraft after the
mission. As the wireless mission data system is designed for a defence organization,
the security of the wireless communication is given special attention.
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides information
about the FINAF’s materiel and the Grob platform. It will also further introduce the
behaviour of the wireless mission data transfer system. Chapter 3 introduces basic
wireless communication technologies and a decision of the technology to implement
the wireless mission data transfer system is made. This chapter will also introduce
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the theoretical background of modern wireless communication systems. Chapter 4
will go through the various standards which are used to build the security of Wireless
Local Area Networks (WLAN). Two additional ways for gaining better security are
proposed. Chapter 5 introduces the trial system that is used to test the designed
system. Test procedures are introduced and also the results. Finally chapter 6
concludes the thesis.
32. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Patria is performing a large scale avionics upgrade for the FINAF Grob fleet. Grob
aircraft (GO) will supersede the current Valmet L-70 Vinka fleet as the elementary
training aircraft. FINAF acquired 28 Grob G 115Es from Babcock Aerospace Limited.
Aircraft were previously used as training aircraft for the Royal Air Force in England
[1]. Grob 115E can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Grob 115E [1]
The current Valmet L-70 Vinka fleet has served as the FINAF’s elementary training
aircraft since 1980. The Valmet L-70 Vinka was designed and built by Valmet Oy in
the 1970s. The Vinka has gone through minor structural and avionics modifications
during the service years. The operational flight training and aircraft maintenance of
Vinkas’ and Grobs’ have been outsourced by FINAF to Patria. [2]
The aim of this thesis is to design and implement a wireless data transfer system
system for mission data of the Grob 115E aircraft. The system will consist of Ground
Station (GS) which will be fixed to the location where the aircraft are normally
operating and the needed equipment that will be installed to the aircraft for enabling
the wireless connectivity. This thesis mainly focuses to the selection of the technology
that can be used to implement the wireless communication system, the GS and
other related systems will be briefly covered. The designed wireless communication
system will not be operable in flight, which means that it can be used only when
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the aircraft is stationary on ground. For flight safety and to not cause any harmful
interference to flight critical systems, it must be ensured that the designed wireless
communication system is not functional in flight. This can be done physically or
with software. Figure 2.2 represents the environment where the designed wireless
mission data transfer system will operate.
30m
1m
GO
GS
10m
Figure 2.2. The communication ranges of the wireless mission data transfer system
As seen from the Figure 2.2, the communication range is roughly 30 meters. The
range will highly limit the possible technical solutions for the wireless communication.
The antenna heights of GS and GO are not precise, but the values shown in the
Figure 2.2 can be assumed to be feasible. In normal operation there are no buildings,
vehicles or other equipment between the GS’s and the GO’s antennas. Due to this,
the radio signal propagation can be examined as Line-of-sight (LOS) propagation.
Terms LOS and NLOS (Non-line-of-sight) are used frequently when considering
wireless communications.
In the first phase of the Grob upgrade program the data exchange between the
aircraft and the ground station will be carried out by using physical transfer media,
such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory stick. This thesis aims to streamline the
data exchange process by suggesting a wireless communication system for the task.
The mission data system is used to bring data about the upcoming mission from
the pre-flight brief to the aircraft. During the flight, the system will record audio,
video and certain flight parameters. After the flight the recorded data will be used
to analyze the mission. Figure 2.3 shows the data flow between the GS and the GO
aircraft.
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GO
GS
Figure 2.3. The data flow
The biggest challenge in the wireless implementation is the massive amount of data.
The amount of data that is brought to the aircraft before the flight can be a few
kilobytes (kB), but the recorded data including audio, video and flight parameters
can be over 4 gigabytes (GB), assuming that the whole flight is recorded and the
flight lasts for an hour. Also at this stage, the data recorder is not connected to the
aircraft’s battery buses, so the data recorder shuts down when the aircraft’s power
generator is turned oﬀ. This fact sets boundaries to the wireless communication
system, as it limits the time window during which the data has to be transferred.
There are yet no specific requirements for the wireless mission data transfer system,
meaning that e.g the time window during which the data has to be transferred is
not clearly specified. For being able to choose the wireless communication standard
and to be able to reasonably evaluate the results, it is here assumed that the length
of the time window is five minutes. Also for calculations, the amount of transferable
data is assumed to be 4 GB in total. The wireless mission data transfer system can
be simultaneously used by up to 5 Grob aircraft [3].
Because of the bidirectional data traffic between the GO aircraft and the GS, the
term data recorder is slightly misleading. For this reason, from now on term Data
Transfer Device (DTD) is used from the Grob’s data recorder.
The upgraded mission data system will consist of the following components:
• Camera
• Multi-Function display (MFD)
• Data Transfer Device (DTD)
• Memory unit
Camera is used to capture video and audio from the flight. MFD is used to display
map and other flight parameters. MFD also processes the needed flight parameters
and transfers them to the DTD. DTD records video and audio that is transferred
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from camera to DTD via 3rd. Generation Serial Digital Interface (3G-SDI). MFD
transfers flight parameters to DTD via RS-422 serial interface. DTD stores the video
and flight parameters to the memory unit. The system can be also used to load
mission briefing data to the MFD before the flight.
Figure 2.4 presents a high level block diagram of the mission data system. Figure 2.4
also illustrates the wireless part of the mission data system that is to be designed.
Data Transfer 
Device
Camera
Multi-function 
display
Memory unit
3G-SDI RS-422
USB
Ground station
Figure 2.4. High level block diagram of Grob 115E mission data system
73. WIRELESS NETWORKS
The evolution of wireless communications started in 1888 when a German physicist,
Heinrich Rudolf Hertz discovered radio waves. The unit of frequency, hertz (Hz)
has been named after Heinrich Rudolf Hertz. After the discovery of radio waves,
wireless communications have been taking giant leaps forward during the years. First
packet-based wireless network was developed in 1971 by researchers of the University
of Hawaii. This network was called ALOHANET, and it was used to communicate
with computers between four islands. [4]
Nowadays there are plenty of wireless technologies available. When designing a
system that involves wireless communications, the wireless technology to be used
must be chosen wisely. When choosing a wireless communication technology for the
task, ground rules are set by required data rate or throughput and communication
range.
Wireless communication technologies can be grouped harshly by their range into four
categories. Wide Area Network (WAN) includes technologies such as Global System
for Mobile Communications (GSM), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS) and Long Term Evolution (LTE). These three are the most popular mobile
cellular network technologies. The upcoming 5G technology belongs partly to WAN,
but 5G also introduces e.g millimeter Waves (mmWave) for higher frequencies, which
are intended for much shorter ranges [5]. Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) includes
technologies like Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMax). WiMax
has been used to create city wide wireless networks and to provide Internet access
for rural areas. Local Area Networks (LAN) includes one of the most distinguished
wireless technology called Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi belongs more precisely to Wireless Local
Area Networks (WLAN). In fact, due to its high popularity Wi-Fi has become almost
like a synonym for WLAN. Personal Area Networks (PAN) includes many short
range technologies, such as Bluetooth and Near Field Communications (NFC).
3.1 Choosing the Wireless Technology
Chapter 2 introduced the existing requirements and the restrictions for the wireless
mission data system. The technology for implementing the wireless mission data
system is chosen based on these issues. Based on these issues, the throughput is
considered as the prime parameter when choosing the communication technology.
The communication range for the mission data system is approximately 30 meters.
The range implicates that technologies belonging to PAN would not be sufficient.
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Technologies belonging to PAN are often intended for shorter ranges than 30 meters
and the throughputs are not adequate. The wireless communication in the 30 m
range could be implemented with technologies belonging to LAN, MAN or WAN.
Technologies in MAN and WAN are intended for longer ranges than 30 m, but
in despite of that they could still be used for the wireless communication in this
thesis. As stated before, the biggest requirements for the wireless communication
technology are the throughput and also the capacity. In this thesis the throughput
from a single GO aircraft to the GS is mainly considered. However in the final
implementation, there might be up to five aircraft simultaneously transferring data
via the wireless communication system. For this reason, the chosen technology has
to support multiple simultaneous users.
Based on previously mentioned aspects, two wireless technologies began to raise
interest: Private LTE and Wi-Fi. Private LTE is a cellular technology based on
LTE, but it can be deployed and administrated locally by the end user. Wi-Fi is a
WLAN technology that is recognized by almost everyone and everywhere. Private
LTE solutions are provided for enterprises by for example Nokia. Private LTE could
be one possibility for the wireless mission data system, because it can be deployed
locally in such way, that the data doesn’t have to travel through operators core
network. LTE operates in licensed frequencies, but Nokia’s Private LTE also has
a possibility to be deployed at unlicensed frequencies. This way the deployment
would be easier, because frequencies wouldn’t have to be split with the local cellular
network operators. [6] LTE Advanced (LTE-A) and LTE Advanced Pro (LTE-A Pro)
promise data rates up to 3 Gigabits Per Second (Gb/s) in Downlink (DL) and 1.5
Gb/s in Uplink (UL) [7].
Wi-Fi standards are using unlicensed frequencies and the devices that are using these
standards are sold by many vendors for both consumers and enterprises. At the time
of writing this thesis, the newest fully released Wi-Fi standard capable for the task
is 802.11ac. Theoretically the newest revisions of 802.11ac can provide data rates
up to 7 Gb/s in both DL and UL directions. [8] 802.11ac has some drawbacks in
multiuser (MU) performance in UL communication, but the upcoming 802.11ax that
should be released in 2019 brings new features to fix these drawbacks.
In this thesis, Wi-Fi standards were chosen for more precise examination. The main
reason for choosing Wi-Fi standards over Private LTE was the ease of deployment.
There are numerous of vendors oﬀering devices for Wi-Fi, and because of the high
demand the prices are low. However, Private LTE would be a viable solution for the
wireless mission data system and it could be further examined in the future.
3.2 Radio Frequencies
Radio spectrum is the part of electromagnetic wave spectrum that is used for radio
communications. Radio frequencies are starting from 3 Hz and they go up to 3000
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GHz. Radio spectrum is a finite resource and thus it must be used eﬀectively. Radio
frequency (RF) planning and regulation are carried out in both international and
national levels. The radio communication sector of the United Nations International
Telecommunication Union (ITU-R) allocates the global radio spectrum. Finnish
Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) regulates the frequency usage
nationally in Finland. The intention of frequency planning and regulation is to
oﬀer interference free radio bands for diﬀerent telecommunication systems and users.
ITU-R has divided the radio spectrum into 9 frequency bands (See Table 3.1).
Table 3.1. ITU radio frequency bands
Band Band name Abbreviation Frequency range
4 Very Low Frequency VLF 3 - 30 kHz
5 Low Frequency LF 30 - 300 kHz
6 Medium Frequency MF 300 - 3000 kHz
7 High Frequency HF 3 - 30 MHz
8 Very High Frequency VHF 30 - 300 MHz
9 Ultra High Frequency UHF 300 - 3000 MHz
10 Super High Frequency SHF 3 - 30 GHz
11 Extremely High Frequency EHF 30 - 300 GHz
12 Tremendously High Frequency THF 300 - 3000 GHz
3.2.1 Unlicensed Radio Spectrum
ITU-R has allocated sections of radio spectrum for industrial, scientific and medical
(ISM) usage. Originally ISM-bands were especially meant for other use cases than
radio communications. These bands were used by e.g microwave ovens, induction
heating and other devices or technologies that might cause high interference in the
frequency band. Afterwards many low distance radio communication technologies
have started to utilize ISM-bands, like WLAN, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
and Bluetooth. ISM-bands are unlicensed and do not require a permission to be
used. The fact that ISM-bands are unlicensed makes them very popular amongst
variety of technologies. By using ISM-bands users won’t have to pay high fees as in
when using the licensed radio spectrum. Due to high popularity, the technologies
have to withstand interference from other technologies that are operating at the
same frequency band. Although using frequencies from unlicensed radio spectrum
will not need any permission to be used, the transmitting powers are always limited.
[9] Devices and technologies using unlicensed spectrum will often have to comply
with Listen-Before-Talk (LBT) principle, if the transmit power exceeds certain level.
The idea of LBT is highly intuitive; the transmitting device listens to the channel
before transmitting to avoid interfering other devices. LBT prevents devices from
hogging the radio spectrum that is meant to be shared. [10]
The 2.4 GHz ISM-band has been widely used by WLANs. However, many WLAN
channels are located higher at frequency. 5.725 - 5.875 GHz ISM-band is also used by
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WLANs, but there are more WLAN channels located between these two ISM-bands.
FICORA’s orders for WLAN networks’ frequency usage can be seen from Table 3.2.
These frequencies can be used by WLANs in addition to the ISM-bands. Table 3.2
also shows the maximum Eﬀective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) that is allowed
in the frequency band.
Table 3.2. WLAN frequencies in Finland [11]
Frequency range Peak EIRP
863.00 – 868.00 MHz 41 mW
2400.00 – 2483.50 MHz 100 mW
5150.00 – 5250.00 MHz 200 mW
5250.00 – 5350.00 MHz 200 mW
5470.00 – 5725.00 MHz 1 W
57.00 – 66.00 GHz 10 W
3.3 Fundamentals of Wireless Communications
Wireless transmission can be purely analog, or the system can include both analog
and digital parts. Even if the data source is digital, the wireless communication
system uses electromagnetic waves as the transfer medium, which are analog. In this
thesis, the technologies under consideration are utilizing digital transmission, so the
analog parts of the typical communication system outside of transmitter and receiver
are not discussed. Figure 3.1 represents a block diagram of a transmission system,
the channel block contains the used transfer medium, which is radio waves in the
case of wireless communications.
TransmitterData source Channel Receiver Data sink
Transmission system
Figure 3.1. Simple block diagram of wireless communication system
The basic parameters that are describing the behaviour and the performance of a
digital transmission system are:
• Transfer rate (bits/s)
• Error rate
• Delay
Bit (b) is the basic unit of data that is used in digital communications. Transfer
rate of a digital communication system is in many cases represented in bits per
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second. It must be noted that the reported transfer rates of a digital communication
system often diﬀer from the achieved transfer rate due to overhead caused by dif-
ferent network layers and protocols. Wireless communication systems are prone for
interferences which reduces the system performance. Unit Bit Error Rate (BER)
is used to describe the error rate of the system. BER represents the percentage of
the transferred bits that were erroneous. Delay consists of signal propagation delay
and used signal processing methods. The significance of these parameters is heavily
dependent on the purpose of the wireless communication system. Some applications,
like Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication between two automated cars require a
small delay. On the other hand, for example IoT applications usually won’t have
this kind of requirements.
Following sections are covering common techniques that are used in modern wireless
communication technologies.
3.3.1 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a special case of Multicarrier
Modulation (MCM). In multicarrier modulation, the transferable bitstream is divided
into multiple streams and transferred using multiple subcarriers. Every subcarrier
is modulated individually. The idea in MCM is to divide the available channel
into smaller subcarriers. The number of subcarriers is chosen in such way that the
amplitude response of each channel would be constant. [12]
OFDM is tolerant of time synchronization error, it is bandwidth efficient and thus it
has been widely used in wireless communication technologies [4]. The word ”orthog-
onal” in OFDM means that the peak of each subcarrier locates where neighbouring
subcarriers’ signals crosses the zero. The orthogonality also makes OFDM band-
width efficient, since the subcarriers can be located near each other in frequency,
without causing Inter Carrier Interference (ICI). Orthogonality is achieved by using
a subcarrier spacing that is an integer multiple of the inverse of the OFDM symbol
duration [12].
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Figure 3.2 represents a single OFDM subcarrier, and a OFDM signal consisting of
five independent subcarriers.
Frequency Frequency
a) b)
Figure 3.2. The subfigure a) shows the spectra of a single OFDM subcarrier,
subfigure b) shows the spectra of OFDM signal.
The OFDM symbol of duration 𝑇𝑠 is mathematically given by
𝑥(𝑡) =
𝑁−1
∑
𝑘=0
𝑋(𝑘)𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑖2𝜋𝑓𝑘𝑡] (3.1)
where 𝑋(𝑘) is a complex data symbol from the used symbol alphabet. The subcarrier
frequencies are defined as
𝑓𝑘 = 𝑓0 + 𝑘𝛥𝑓 (3.2)
where 𝑓0 is the frequency of the first subcarrier, 𝑘 is the subcarrier index and 𝛥𝑓 is
the subcarrier spacing. The subcarrier spacing, which is the frequency separation of
the subcarriers, is given as
𝛥𝑓 = 1/𝑇𝑠 (3.3)
where 𝑇𝑠 is the used symbol duration. The smallest usable subcarrier spacing, which
also results in the best spectral efficiency is 1/𝑇𝑠.
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Figure 3.3 represents a simplified block diagram of a OFDM transmission system.
IDFT
Serial to 
parallel
Parallel to 
serial
GI insertion
Symbol 
mapping
DAC
ADCGI removal
Serial to 
parallel
DFT
Parallel to 
serial
Symbol 
detection
Data 
source
Data 
sink
Channel
Channel
Figure 3.3. Simplified block diagram of the OFDM transmission system showing
the baseband processing parts.
On the top left corner of the Figure is the input of the transmission system. The data
source block consists of digital data that is then mapped into symbols from the chosen
alphabet. If the used modulation method is 256 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
(256-QAM), the alphabet consists of 256 diﬀerent symbols. With 256-QAM, each
symbol embodies 8 bits. The next block converts the stream of modulated symbols
into multiple parallel streams. The number of parallel streams is the number of used
OFDM subcarriers. IDFT block calculates inverse fourier transform (IDFT) for each
symbol in each subcarrier. IDFT and Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) are widely
used algorithms in digital signal processing [12]. In OFDM systems, DFT and IDFT
are generally implemented with Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and Inverse Fast
Fourier Transform (IFFT). With FFT and IFFT, the DFT and IDFT operations
can be implemented with high efficiency [13]. After IDFT, the parallel streams of
subcarriers are serialized and formed into a one OFDM-signal, after which the Guard
Interval (GI) is inserted. Guard interval is added to every OFDM symbol to increase
its length. In OFDM systems, the GI is often implemented as Cyclic Prefix (CP).
With CP, OFDM system is protected against channel delay spread, which is caused
by multi-path propagation [14]. Multi-path propagation is a destructive eﬀect, which
causes reflected (i.e delayed) signals to be summed to the original signal at the
receiver. This unwanted signal summation yields to harmful phenomenon called
Inter Symbol Interference (ISI). The length of CP is defined as 𝑇𝑔, and the length
of 𝑇𝑔 must exceed the length of the maximum multi-path delay 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥 of the channel
to completely elude ISI. [13]. With the added CP, the length of OFDM-symbol is
defined as
𝑇 = 𝑇𝑠 + 𝑇𝑔 (3.4)
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Figure 3.4 represents the time composition of OFDM symbol. Figure 3.4 illustrates
how the CP is implemented, CP is the end portion of the symbol that it is used to
prefix the symbol itself.
Tg Ts
T
Figure 3.4. OFDM symbol composition
The power of OFDM is that the orthogonality of the subcarriers can be preserved
despite of multipath propagation with the help of CP. Next the digital OFDM-signal
is converted into an analog waveform and transmitted to the wireless channel. The
OFDM system in Figure 3.3 in fact produces a complex baseband signal, which has
to be modulated with I/Q modulator to generate a passband RF waveform [15]. The
receiver functions are more or less the same as in the transmitter, but reversed.
3.3.2 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) is a MU variant of OFDM,
and it is well known for its deployment in LTE and WiMax. In OFDMA, channels
are consisting of multiple subcarriers, as in OFDM, but the subcarriers are divided
into multiple groups instead of just one. These groups are called Resource Units
(RU) and they can be shared between multiple users. In OFDM, one user uses all
the subcarriers at the same time, so only one user is able to access the channel
at a certain time. In OFDMA, RUs are allowing the channel to be occupied by
multiple users at a certain time. Figure 3.5 clarifies the basic diﬀerences of OFDM
and OFDMA, diﬀerent users have been marked with diﬀerent colors and unused
resources in Figure 3.5 have been marked with grey diagonal pattern.
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Figure 3.5. Conceptual illustration that shows diﬀerences between OFDM and
OFDMA
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OFDMA allows to allocate RUs for users based on the knowledge of the channel
frequency response. As the channel frequency response varies especially with mobile
users, OFDMA allows to select the most suitable channel (i.e RU) for every user [16].
OFDMA also brings flexibility to the transmission systems, because the transmitter
is able to control the gain of each RU separately. Transmitting power of single RU
can be increased to better serve users with weaker channel conditions by decreasing
the transmitting power for RUs with better channel conditions. The size of the RUs
is not fixed, so smaller RUs can be allocated e.g for users that require better Signal
to Noise Ratio (SNR).
3.3.3 Multiple-input Multiple-output
Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) is a transmission scheme in which the
transmitter and the receiver are using multiple antennas to communicate. MIMO
can be implemented with Space Time Coding (STC) or with spatial multiplexing.
With STC, single data stream is duplicated and transmitted with multiple antennas.
Space time codes are used to encode the parallel, redundant streams to make the
transmitted signals orthogonal with each other. At the receiver, signals are separated
and the original data stream is recovered. [17] With STC, the transmit and receive
diversities are used to improve the quality of the transmission.
Other implementation of MIMO is called spatial multiplexing. Spatial multiplexing,
which is also referred as true MIMO, is used to boost spectral efficiency. With spatial
multiplexing, the transmitter divides the data stream into multiple parallel streams.
These streams are transmitted and received with a specified 𝑇𝑋/𝑅𝑋 antenna pair.
Gain in spectral efficiency is achieved by transmitting multiple signals in the same
frequency band. Due to multi-path propagation, signals will propagate through the
channel by using diﬀerent routes. This is the basic concept of spatial multiplexing.
At the receiver, estimates of the channels are used for correctly detecting separate
signals. [18]
The channel capacity 𝐶 in MIMO system that is utilizing spatial multiplexing can
be represented with Shannon-Hartley Theorem as:
𝐶 = 𝑀 × 𝐵 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(1 + 𝑆𝑁𝑅) (3.5)
where 𝑀 is the number or spatial streams, 𝐵 is the channel bandwidth and 𝑆𝑁𝑅 is
the Signal to Noise Ratio. An example of a MIMO system is presented in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6. Basic block diagram of a MIMO communication system
3.3.4 Beamforming
Antenna directivity is a basic concept in RF technology. With directional antennas,
the transmission or reception of an antenna can be focused to a specific direction. The
value of antenna directivity is known as antenna gain. The higher the antenna gain
is, the larger amount of the total power is transmitted or received. Antennas with
high gain are often expensive and large in size. Luckily, multiantenna communication
systems provide an alternative solution for high gain antennas with beamforming.
Beamforming or alternatively beam steering is a concept, in which the transmission
or reception of multiple antennas, called an antenna array, can be focused to a certain
direction. Beamforming can be used even if the antennas of antenna array are omni-
directional, meaning that the antennas radiate in every direction. In beamforming,
the phase and amplitude of each antenna’s signal are adjusted. This results in a
direction-dependent constructive or destructive signal summation. It must be noted
that beamforming works most eﬀectively in LOS propagation. Beamforming can be
implemented analogically, digitally with the transceiver’s Digital Signal Processor
(DSP) -algorithms or with the combination of these two. Analog beamformers include
multiple phase shifters and one or more signal combiners. [19, 20]
Beamforming can be implemented either implicitly or explicitly. Implicit beamform-
ing means that the beamformer generates the beamforming parameters based on
the channel information gathered from the received signal. This means that the
beamformee, does not estimate the channel, only the beamformer. On the contrary, in
explicit beamforming the beamformee estimates the channel and sends this estimate
back to the beamformer. Beamformer will then adjust the beamforming parameters
based on the beamformee’s channel estimation. Implicit beamforming adds less
overhead to the transmission system, but it is less accurate. [21]
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3.4 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi is a trademark of a non-profit association called Wi-Fi Alliance. Wi-Fi alliance
is a group of companies that are participating in the development of Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards. Wi-Fi Alliance was
originally founded in 1999. Back then the foundation was called Wireless Ethernet
Compatibility Alliance (WECA) and it was renamed to Wi-Fi Alliance in 2003. The
need for an association that certifies Wi-Fi products became clear briefly after the
first 802.11 standard was published. Many vendors published products that were not
fully compatible with the standards. [22] Wi-Fi Alliance’s certification ensures that
the products meet the standards for interoperability, security and other application
specific protocols. Any product that utilizes 802.11 standards and has been certified
by the Wi-Fi Alliance will have a Wi-Fi Certified seal of approval.
Against common belief Wi-Fi is not a shortname for Wireless Fidelity. Wireless
Fidelity was a slogan that was used by Wi-Fi Alliance in the early days of Wi-Fi.
Wi-Fi is simply a trademarked, consumer friendly name for IEEE 802.11 standards.
In October 2018, Wi-Fi Alliance announced a new naming policy for the Wi-Fi
standards. Wi-Fi Alliance will identify IEEE 802.11n with Wi-Fi 4, 802.11ac with
Wi-Fi 5 and the upcoming 802.11ax with Wi-Fi 6. Older IEEE 802.11 standards
will not get new names. [23]
Generally when talking about Wi-Fi systems, terms Station (STA) and Access Point
(AP) are being used. STA is a single entity, or client that can be connected to the
AP or other STAs via the wireless medium. AP includes one STA, and in addition it
also provides access to the distribution services via the wireless medium for other
connected STAs.
IEEE 802.11 standard is a part of IEEE 802 LAN and MAN networking family and it
adopts the 48-bit addressing scheme, which is better known as MAC address scheme.
MAC addresses can be used to identify the devices in Ethernet and Wi-Fi networks.
To gain better understanding about the concepts of diﬀerent network layers, Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is often used. OSI model divides the commu-
nication systems usually into seven abstraction layers, but there are also variants
of the OSI model with diﬀerent amount of abstraction layers. The IEEE 802.11
standard defines PHY and MAC layers for the Wi-Fi communication. 802.11 PHY
layer implements the lowest layer of the OSI model, which is called physical layer.
In IEEE 802.11, the second layer consists of MAC layer and Logical Link Control
(LLC) layer, these layers together are forming the OSI model’s data link layer. The
7-layer OSI-model is presented in Table 3.3
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Table 3.3. OSI model
OSI model layers Description Examples
7. Application Used by applications that are visible to the
user
HTTP, FTP
6. Presentation This layer’s protocols are used for adapting
the data for the application layer’s applica-
tions
TLS, SSL
5. Session Used to establish communication sessions NetBIOS
4. Transport Used to transfer data reliably from end to end,
implements flow control, packet segmentation
and error control
TCP, UDP
3. Network Provides methods to transfer variable length
data from source to destination
IP, IPsec
2. Data link Provides the means for transferring data be-
tween devices
LLC, MPLS
802.11 MAC
1. Physical Provides the physical and electrical specifica-
tions for the devices
802.11 PHY
3.4.1 IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control
When the idea of WLAN was elaborated, it was thought as just another Physical
Layer (PHY) implementation for the existing IEEE standards. The most dominant
standard of IEEE was 802.3, Ethernet. It was quickly realized that the radio medium
diﬀers very much from the familiar wire. In wireless environment high attenuation,
and the fact that the transmitter can only sense its own signal when transmitting
causes collisions to be undetectable. This is the reason why Ethernet’s Medium Access
Control (MAC), Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
could not be applied. It was understood that the wireless medium would need its
own MAC, and in 1991 project 802.11 was approved. The MAC for 802.11 is Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). CSMA/CA follows
LBT principle. The transmitting STA listens to the wireless medium before trying
to transmit, if there is already an ongoing transmission, the listening STA will wait
for a time period defined by binary exponential backoﬀ algorithm. After the waiting
period, the STA will retry the transmission. The medium has to be idle before
STA begins the transmission. This is the basic principle of the carrier sensing. As
collisions can’t be detected in wireless environment, the next best thing to do is to
try to avoid collisions as well as possible. [24]
Wireless LAN also suﬀers from another problem that does not occur in wired
environment, the hidden node problem. The basic problem is caused by the fact that
all STAs in the same WLAN are not able to communicate directly with each other.
As said before, the MAC layer of 802.11 already ensures that the STA will only begin
transmitting after it has sensed the channel to be idle. Now if the two STAs can’t
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communicate with each other, they are not able to sense each other’s transmissions.
An example illustration of the hidden node problem is presented in Figure 3.7.
A
B
C
Figure 3.7. The hidden node problem
In the example of the Figure 3.7 there are three STAs: A, B and C. The hidden node
problem occurs if the STA A has an ongoing transmission to STA B and the STA C
would also like to send a frame for STA B. As the STAs A and C are outside of each
other’s range, STA C can’t sense whether the channel is idle or not. Now if the STA
C begins the transmission and the channel isn’t idle, the ongoing transmission from
STA A to STA B would corrupt, as well as the transmission from STA C to STA B.
The hidden node problem is solved by IEEE 802.11 MAC with Request to Send (RTS)
and Clear to Send (CTS) protocol. RTS/CTS protocol adds these two additional
frames to the MAC layer’s frame exchange protocol. The source STA sends a RTS
frame to the destination. If the destination senses that the channel is idle, it sends a
CTS frame back to the source. This indicates that the channel is really free, and the
source can send the actual frame that it wanted to transmit. After the actual frame
is received correctly, the destination will send an Acknowledgement (ACK) frame to
the source. The CTS frames will be received by every STA that is in the range, and
they can delay their own transmissions when the CTS is received. The behavior of
the RTS/CTS protocol, and how it solves the hidden node problem, is illustrated in
Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8. Solving the hidden node problem with RTS/CTS
In Figure 3.8 there are the same 3 STAs as before, but now the RTS/CTS protocol
is in use. The STA in the middle sends a CTS frame to the STA on the left side,
after which the STA on the left begins the transmission. The STA on the right side
also receives the CTS frame that was sent for the STA on the left and delays it’s
own transmissions, if there are any.
3.4.2 Evolution of IEEE 802.11 Standards
The first specification for 802.11 was published in 1997 by IEEE’s 802.11 working
group. This specification only defined 1 Megabits per Second (Mb/s) and 2 Mb/s
data rates at 2.4 GHz frequency. At the physical layer it provided three solutions:
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS), Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
(DSSS) and Infrared (IR). FHSS and DSSS were operable at 2.4 GHz and IR at 316-
353 THz, but commercial IR application was never released. Later 802.11 working
group was expanded into two groups, 802.11a and 802.11b. 802.11a worked with 5
GHz and 802.11b with 2.4 GHz. [25]
Both 802.11a and 802.11b were published in 1999. 802.11b introduced Complementary
Code Keying (CCK) modulation scheme, which supported up to 11 Mb/s data rates.
802.11a applied OFDM which supported up to 54 Mb/s. Diﬀerent modulation
methods between 802.11a and 802.11b led to interoperability issues with these two
standards. 802.11g, which was released in 2003, merged the OFDM modulation from
802.11a to be used in 2.4 GHz.
3. Wireless networks 21
Table 3.4 shows diﬀerent 802.11 standards. There can be found many more 802.11
standards and their amendments online, but these are the major standards that have
been developed. The maximum data rates shown in this table are maximum data
rates per stream. If multiple streams can be used, the data rates will get higher.
Table 3.4. 802.11 standards
Standard Frequency Channel Width Maximum data rate
Legacy 802.11 2.4 GHz 20 MHz 2 Mbps
802.11b 2.4 GHz 20 MHz 11 Mbps
802.11a 5 GHz 20 MHz 54 Mbps
802.11g 2.4 GHz 20 MHz 54 Mbps
802.11n 2.4 or 5 GHz 20, 40 MHz 450 Mbps
802.11ac wave1 5 GHz 80 MHz 866.7 Mbps
802.11ac wave2 5 GHz 80, 80+80, 160 MHz 1.73 Gbps
Newer 802.11 standards are using MIMO-OFDM. With MIMO-OFDM the transmit-
ting STA can use more than one spatial streams to gain higher throughput. The first
802.11 standard to support MIMO was 802.11n, that was released in 2009. 802.11n
supported a maximum of four spatial streams, which were able to serve a single user.
Transmit Beamforming (TXBF) was introduced by 802.11n in 2009. The TXBF
was not a mandatory part of the standard and the decision to implement it was left
for the device manufacturers. Many devices are also operating with single antenna,
so TBXF can’t be used with these devices. Figure 3.9 shows conceptual image of
beamforming. The Figure shows two cases, other with no beamforming in use and
other with beamforming in use.
a) b)
Figure 3.9. AP and two STAs. Subfigure a) represents an AP without
beamforming, b) represents AP that is utilizing beamforming.
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3.4.3 IEEE 802.11ac
IEEE 802.11ac is an amendment to the existing IEEE 802.11 standard and it was
published in 2013. 802.11ac was aimed to provide Very High Throughput (VHT) in
5 GHz frequency bands, below 6 GHz. 802.11ac operates only at 5 Ghz frequencies
because it uses wider bandwidth than previous 802.11 standards. Frequency bands
at 2.4 GHz don’t have space for 802.11ac’s 80 and 160 MHz channels. There are also
many more non-overlapping channels available at 5 Ghz than in 2.4 Ghz [26]. The
802.11ac standard that was published in 2013 is sometimes called 802.11ac Wave 1.
IEEE split the development of 802.11ac in two for testing the more advanced features
of 802.11ac, the other branch was called 802.11ac Wave 2. The more advanced
features of 802.11ac Wave 2 included MU-MIMO, four spatial streams and up to 160
MHz channels with channel bonding. [27]
Compared to previous 802.11n standard, 802.11ac increased the throughput with
following mechanisms:
• MU-MIMO
• Larger channel bandwidths of 80 and 160 MHz
• More efficient modulation and coding scheme (MCS) with 256-quadrature
amplitude modulation (256-QAM)
MU-MIMO brings the possibility for the AP to transmit diﬀerent spatial streams for
multiple users. This basically means that more than one STA can receive multiple
spatial streams simultaneously from the AP. 802.11ac’s 256-QAM modulation oﬀers
significant boost in the PHY layer throughtput, as one symbol contains 8 bits. 256-
QAM can be used with 3/4 and 5/6 coding rates. Coding rate defines the number
of redundant bits used in Forward Error Correction (FEC). With coding rate 𝑛/𝑚,
there are 𝑚 − 𝑛 redundant bits per 𝑚 bits. With 802.11n’s highest order modulation,
64-QAM, one symbol contains 6 bits. 802.11n coding rate with 64-QAM is 5/6.
While higher modulation methods increase throughput, they will also need better
SNR for correct demodulation. Term Modulation and Coding Scheme (MCS) is
often used when talking about diﬀerent coding rates and modulation densities. The
used MCS is chosen so that the required transmission reliability and data rate is
achieved. 802.11ac’s new 256-QAM modulation is used to form two new MCSs, MCS
8 and MCS 9. MCS 8 uses 256-QAM with 3/4 coding rate and MCS 9 uses the same
modulation but the coding rate is 5/6. All of the VHT MCSs that are defined in
802.11ac standard, can be seen from Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5. VHT MCSs
VHT MCS Modulation Coding
0 BPSK 1/2
1 QPSK 1/2
2 QPSK 3/4
3 16-QAM 1/2
4 16-QAM 3/4
5 64-QAM 2/3
6 64-QAM 3/4
7 64-QAM 5/6
8 256-QAM 3/4
9 256-QAM 5/6
802.11ac was the first 802.11 standard to fully implement TXBF. The TXBF starts
with channel sounding. The beamformer sends a Null Data Packet (NDP) for the
beamformee, after receiving the NDP, the beamformee analyzes the OFDM training
fields associated with each 𝑇𝑋/𝑅𝑋 antenna pair. The analyzed results are formed
into a feedback matrix, that is based on the amplitude and phase of each signal.
After that the beamformee calculates the signal angles and includes them to the
feedback matrix. Feedback matrix is then transmitted to the beamformer. The
beamformer uses the feedback matrix to create steering matrix, that can be used
to create a directional beam from the omnidirectional beam. The channel sounding
procedure is presented in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10. Channel sounding procedure in beamforming
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The 802.11ac standard supports DL MU-MIMO only, because it is assumed that the
STAs will consume more data than they produce. Also enabling the MU-MIMO in
both UL and DL directions will need much more complex algorithms at the AP and
STA.
3.4.4 IEEE 802.11.ax
The next generation WLAN technology is called 802.11ax. IEEE approved 802.11ax
in March 2014 and the standard is expected to be complete in 2019. 802.11ax will
be a dual-band technology, so it will operate in both 2.4- and 5 GHz frequencies.
802.11ax will bring improvements in per user throughput, operation in user-dense
environments and in latencies. The main features of 802.11ax are:
• OFDMA physical layer
• DL- and UL-MU-MIMO
• Trigger frame
• Spatial reuse (SR)
• OFDMA random access
• Target Wake Time (TWT)
• Station-to-Station (S2S) operation
In 802.11ax OFDMA is used in both DL and UL directions.
The subcarrier spacing in 802.1ax has been reduced from previous standards. In
802.11ac, the subcarrier spacing was 312.5 kHz, but in 802.11ax the subcarrier
spacing has been reduced to 78.125 kHz. This results in a four times larger amount
of subcarriers. [28] Respectively, the OFDMA symbol duration and CP length have
been increased by four times. CP is used to eliminate ISI and it can also be used to
verify the symbol integrity. With denser subcarriers and longer OFDMA and CP
durations, the raw data rate of 802.11ax remains the same as in 802.11ac. However,
it increases the data rates by supporting shorter CP lengths in indoor operation, and
with 1024-QAM modulation [29].
802.11ax defines four Physical Protocol Data Units (PPDU) to support High Efficiency
Single-User (HE SU PPDU), Multi-User (HE MU PPDU), Trigger-Based Multi-
User (HE trigger-based PPDU) and Extended Range Transmissions (HE ER SU
PPDU). [28] All of these PPDUs are backwards compatible with the previous 802.11
standards.
As discussed in section 3.4.1, devices using legacy 802.11 MAC are only trying to
transmit when the channel is sensed to be free. This was the basic princinple of
CSMA/CA. In OFDMA multiple users are sharing same frequency band, so 802.11ax
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will also need a new MAC layer. With OFDMA, ongoing transmission in the channel
does not necessarily obstruct the transmission of other users. The MAC layer of
802.11ax has to be backwards compatible with the legacy 802.11 MAC layer, as
backwards compatibility is one of the ground rules of IEEE 802.11 standards.
In 802.11ac, only DL-MU-MIMO was supported, but 802.11ax also implements
UL-MU-MIMO. One UL-MU-MIMO RU supports up to eight users and a maximum
of four streams per user. 802.11ax introduces new control frame which is called a
trigger frame. Trigger frame is used to initiate UL-MU-MIMO transmissions by
sending the trigger frame from AP to the STAs. The trigger frame tells each STA
information about the UL-MU-MIMO transmission, such as maximum number of
spatial streams, RU allocations, allowed transmit power and the exact moment
in time when the STAs should start the transmission. All of the STAs that are
participating in the UL-MU-MIMO transmission, will transmit their frames at the
same time [29]. After the AP has received the frames from the STAs, an ACK frame
is sent to all corresponding STAs.
802.11ax introduces Spatial Reuse (SR) operations for achieving better throughput
especially in dense environments. Previous 802.11n and 802.11ac standards only al-
lowed transmission when the channel was idle, 802.11ax standard allows transmission
on top of ongoing transmission, if one of the SR conditions is met. In 802.11ax STA is
able to identify transmissions that are belonging to the same Basic Service Set (BSS).
STAs that belong to the same BSS can communicate with each other at PHY-layer.
BSS color can be used in early phase to identify whether the transmission belongs to
Overlapping Basic Service Set (OBSS). Sensing threshold is used to sense whether
the channel is idle or not. With previous 802.11 standards, this sensing threshold
was fixed at -82 dBm. In 802.11ax STAs are allowed to use higher sensing threshold
for example when ongoing transmission is identified to be from OBSS. Using higher
sensing threshold and transmitting on top of OBSS transmissions will improve the
performance of the system. [28]
OFDMA random access is a feature that allows AP to assign one or more unallocated
RUs for random access. STAs are informed about the random access RUs by AP,
and they can use these RUs for UL OFDMA transmissions. OFDMA random access
can be useful for STAs that do not require high throughput, or for STAs whose
transmissions are infrequent. [28]
802.11ax implements a feature called Target Wake Time (TWT). TWT was already
in use in 802.11ah, which was released in 2017. TWT is a Power Saving (PS) feature
that allows STAs to sleep between transmissions more frequently. With TWT, STA
can request a time to wake up any time in the future from the AP. TWT comes
very handy in IoT applications, which will benefit from better power efficiency. In
802.11ax, when STA enters PS mode with TWT procedure, it doesn’t have to listen
to beacon frames sent by AP. Beacon frame is one of the 802.11 network control
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frames that is used to distribute information about the network. TWT can be also
used for better UL-OFDMA scheduling, because the AP knows precisely when certain
STAs are going to wake up. [30]
Higher order MCSs 10 and 11 are also introduced with 802.11ax. MCS 10 uses
1024-QAM modulation with the coding rate of 3/4. MCS 11 also uses 1024-QAM,
but it is paired with 5/6 coding rate. As with 802.11ac, higher order modulation
substantially increases theoretical bitrate, but better SNR is required.
27
4. WI-FI SECURITY ASPECTS
Authentication and confidentiality are the basic measures of wireless security. Au-
thentication means that there needs to be a way to identify that the sender and
the receiver are really who they claim to be. Confidentiality stands for securing
the transmitted data from eavesdropping. A common attack method that targets
network authentication is brute force. In brute force attack, the attacker tries to
guess the password or passphrase by simply trying all of the possible combinations.
Brute force attack is generally very slow and takes a lot of computing power, but
it has and it will stay as a threat with the ever increasing computing power of
modern computing systems. Attacks that are targeting confidentiality of the wireless
network are trying to decrypt the transmitted data, with or without authentication
for the network. The data that the attacker has obtained with eavesdropping must
be decrypted in most cases. It is also possible that the attacker wants to decrease
the availability of the communication system, which means that the communication
system is overloaded with messages or interfered otherwise. This could be done with
Wireless Denial of Service (WDoS) attack, jamming or flooding. Popular Wi-Fi
attack methods can be seen in Figure 4.1.
Wi-Fi attacks
Authentication Confidentiality Avalailability
Brute Force
Dictionary
MiTM
Rogue AP
Hole 196
Key Reinstallation
WDoS
Jamming
Flooding
Figure 4.1. Wi-Fi attack methods, alleviated from [31]
The wireless security protocols used with 802.11 are Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP),
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2 which is a successor of WPA. WEP was
brought to Wi-Fi as a security measure already in 1999 with 802.11b. Nowadays
WEP has been widely replaced with newer security protocols, so this thesis doesn’t
cover WEP any further.
In this thesis’ use scenario, the wireless communication system is located at restricted
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area. So it is quite unlikely that an attacker would gain immediate access to the
hardware of the communication system. This makes at least one attack method that
targets confidentiality, rogue AP, harder to execute. Rogue AP attack method means
that someone installs a new AP to the network and does not configure the wireless
security correctly. Rogue AP attacks can be executed accidentally by an employee, or
by a hacker. Also the eﬀective range of the designed communication system is small,
so eavesdropping or other kind of attacks can’t be easily executed. In Man in The
Middle (MiTM) attack, attacker places a device in the middle of two trusted devices
that are communicating with each other. Attacker then seeks to intercept messages
or insert malicious packets for the devices. Hole 196 attack targets Wi-Fi’s WPA2
security, and it can be used to inject malicious multicast and broadcast packets
into the network. Hole 196 attacks requires successful authentication. [32] Key
reinstallation attack will be introduced in subsection 4.2.1.
In the following sections protocols that are aﬀecting Wi-Fi security are introduced.
4.1 IEEE 802.1x
IEEE 802.1x specifies means for network administrators to restrict the connection
of non-authenticated devices to the IEEE 802 LAN network. The standard applies
for both wired and wireless communications, using for example 802.3 (Ethernet)
or 802.11 (WLAN) standards. The 802.1x ensures secure connection between two
network ports, ports being physical network ports with Ethernet, or logical ports
with WLAN devices. The stations that are connected to the 802 LAN network are
transmitting and receiving data frames according to 802 LAN MAC. [33] 802.1x
operates at layer 2 of the OSI-model. OSI-model can be seen from Table 3.3 in
section 3.4.
The 802.1x defines three members of the network authentication process, Authenti-
cation Server (AS), authenticator and supplicant. Devices that need to authenticate
themselves for connecting to the network, are called supplicants. The supplicant is
directly connected to the authenticator, but never to the authentication server [34].
The authenticator relays messages between the supplicant and the authentication
server, or any other device after having authenticated successfully. 802.1x defines
logical ports named uncontrolled and controlled port [35]. Before the supplicant has
been successfully authenticated, all traffic is passed via uncontrolled port. Corre-
spondingly, after successful authentication traffic is passed through controlled port.
The authentication server is sometimes called RADIUS-server (Remote Authenti-
cation Dial In User Service). The name RADIUS server comes from the protocol
that is used in the communication between the authenticator and the authentication
server. The protocol used between the authenticator and the supplicant is called
EAPOL (Extensible Authentication Protocol Over Lan). Figure 4.2 shows the basic
network members and protocols defined in 802.1x.
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RADIUS EAPOL
Authentication 
server
Authenticator Supplicant
Figure 4.2. 802.1x network members and authentication protocols
The authentication server holds the information about each supplicant that can
be authenticated. Because every supplicant has personal user credentials, network
administrator is able to deny access for single supplicant and other credentials are
still in use. 802.1x however increases complexity for setting up the network, because
every supplicant has to be correctly configured. Incorrectly configured devices are
causing security issues, especially in wireless networks utilizing 802.1x [36].
4.2 IEEE 802.11i
In 2004 the IEEE released a standard named 802.11i, which was developed to enhance
the security weaknesses of WEP and WPA. WPA was previously released in 2002
and it was based on a draft 3 version of 802.11i standard. WPA was released as a
intermediate solution for the security flaws in WEP. After 802.11i was fully released,
Wi-Fi Alliance released WPA2, that is based on and fully interoperable with 802.11i.
[37] Wi-Fi certified devices have implemented Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2)
technique since 2006. 802.11i introduced a new protocol called four-way handshake
that is used in changing cryptographic keys between the network members. The
four-way handshake protocol is designed so that the keys are never disclosed. This
means that the actual passphrase, or Pairwise Master Key (PMK) in this context, is
never transferred during the authorization process. Figure 4.3 presents the four-way
handshake protocol.
Authenticator Supplicant
ANonce
ACK
GTK + MIC
SNonce + MIC
Figure 4.3. The four-way handshake protocol of 802.11i
When the four-way handshake begins, the authenticator sends Authenticator Nonce
(ANonce) message for the supplicant. ANonce is a pseudorandom sequence generated
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by the authenticator, this message also includes a Key Reply Counter (KRC) field.
The supplicant then generates the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) from ANonce,
Supplicant Nonce (SNonce) and the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) that is known by
both authenticator and supplicant. After the PTK has been generated, supplicant
sends SNonce, Message Integrity Check (MIC) and KRC with the same value as
in the first handshake message to the authenticator. Next the authenticator also
generates the PTK with the ANonce, PMK and the received SNonce. Authenticator
then generates Group Temporary Key (GTK). After supplicant has received the
GTK and validated the message, it will send an acknowledgement (ACK) message
for the authenticator. After the authenticator has received the ACK message, the
authentication procedure is complete. [35]
After successful authentication, PTK is used for encrypting and decrypting messages
between the supplicant and authenticator. The supplicant uses GTK for decoding
broadcast messages, which are meant for every authenticated supplicant. Every
message in the four-way handshake is transmitted using the EAPOL protocol defined
in IEEE 802.1x [38]. After the authentication, the authenticator opens IEEE 802.1x
controlled port for the supplicant.
4.2.1 WPA2
WPA2 enhances its successor WPA by introducing Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) based encryption algorithm CCMP. CCMP comes from CMC-MAC Proto-
col, which is an abbreviation for Counter Mode Cipher Block Chaining Message
Authentication Code Protocol. CCMP provides better security than previously used
Temporary Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). WPA2 contains two operation modes:
WPA2-Personal and WPA2-Enterprise. WPA2-Personal uses Pre Shared Key (PSK)
for authentication. The authentication process is executed using the four-way hand-
shake introduced in IEEE 802.11i. By using WPA-2 Personal the network does not
need the authentication server, as every user uses the same PSK for authentication.
WPA2-Personal is generally suitable for home use, or for small offices. The drawback
of WPA2-Personal is that if the PSK is compromised and it must be changed, the
new PSK has to be manually reconfigured for every user. WPA2-Enterprise uses per
user credentials and the authentication server defined in 802.1x.
For many years WPA2 was thought and also proved as secure, when configured prop-
erly [39]. However, in 2016 two researchers from the University of Leuven discovered
weaknesses in the four-way handshake protocol of 802.11i. They found out that
the four-way handshake could be cracked with a special Key Reinstallation Attack,
which the authors have named as KRACK. In KRACK attack, the authenticator is
cloned and the fake authenticator cloned by the attacker is set to intercept messages
between the authenticator and the supplicant. Basically the fake authenticator works
just as in MiTM attacks. KRACK targets to intercept the 4th. message from getting
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to the authenticator. When the authenticator does not receive the 4th. message,
that is the ACK message, it retransmits the 3rd. message. As per the 802.11i
standard, the supplicant installs the PTK after receiving the 3rd. message. Now if
the authenticator retransmits the 3rd. message, it causes the supplicant to reinstall
the PTK, which resets the nonce used in encoding the data. In short, this allows the
attacker to replay, decrypt and/or forge messages. [38, 40]
Quickly after the KRACK attack was brought into general knowledge, the device
vendors began to provide security updates to repair the four-way-handshake protocol.
Nowadays the network can be protected from the KRACK attack, if it is made sure
that the devices’ softwares are up-to-date and the vendor has fixed the issue.
4.3 WPA3
The Wi-Fi Alliance announced the arrival of Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) in
the beginning of 2018. The upcoming devices that are based on IEEE 802.11ax, will
support WPA3 [41]. WPA3 brings a new PSK authentication and key generation
procedure that is based on Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE). SAE
provides a secure generation of cryptographically strong encryption keys. [42] At the
time of writing this thesis, the available documentation about WPA3 is very limited
and therefore the topic can’t be processed thoroughly.
4.4 Additional Security Measures
Previously mentioned security protocols are used to authenticate users to the network
and secure the transmitted data between two users. In addition to these protocols,
the data transmission can be further enhanced with a number of ways. In the
following subsections, implementations of Virtual Private Network (VPN) and Secure
Shell (SSH) are considered as possible ways to further enhance the security. VPN
can be used to create secure, encrypted end-to-end tunnels between two network
locations. VPN is often used by companies to provide access for the employees, or
various stakeholders to access companies’ network resources. VPN oﬀers security
and cost savings, because more secure networks can be implemented with using the
existing Internet infrastructure. SSH can also be used to create encrypted, secure
tunnels between two network locations. With VPN generally all network traffic is
sent through the VPN tunnel. With SSH, every application has to be specifically
configured for using the SSH tunnel.
For the implementation of VPN, there are plenty of options. VPN has increased
its popularity and the number of commercial VPN services for both businesses and
private personnel is increasing rapidly. OpenVPN was chosen for implementing
VPN in this thesis because of its high level of documentation and the fact that its
open-source and free to use. For the SSH tunnel OpenSSH is used, primarily for the
same reasons as OpenVPN.
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It must be noted that every additional security layer adds complexity, which increases
the deployment time as well as restricts the throughput of data.
4.4.1 OpenVPN
OpenVPN is an open-source application originally written by James Yonan. The
initial release of OpenVPN occurred in 2001. OpenVPN communicates through
TCP/IP stack and TUN/TAP interfaces. The TUN and TAP interfaces are software
interfaces (i.e not physical interfaces), and they are referring to network tunnel and
network tap. TUN operates at layer 3 (network layer) with IP packets and thus it
is capable for creating end-to-end tunnels between two OpenVPN processes. TAP
can be used to monitor Ethernet frames at layer 2 (data link layer), TAP mode is
also called bridging mode. [43] The OSI model and the diﬀerent network layers were
introduced in Table 3.3 at chapter 3.4. Figure 4.4 represents a conceptual image of
the message flow when using OpenVPN. Abbreviation NI is used from the physical
Network Interface. Figure shows how the TUN interface is used to monitor messages
from an user application. TUN interface routes the message to OpenVPN process,
which encrypts and repackages the message. Next the message is sent to the recipient
via Internet. The recipient processes the message in reversed order. [43]
OpenVPN
Network application
TUN NI
OpenVPN
Network application
TUNNIInternet
Host A Host B
Figure 4.4. OpenVPN
OpenVPN provides two security models: static key and Transport Layer Security
(TLS). With static key model, two peers are using pre-shared keys for authentication
and encryption. By default, there are two separate keys for both sides, other for
authentication and another for encrypting and decrypting messages. The authen-
tication keys are called HMACs (Hash-based Message Authentication Code). The
pre-shared keys are identical for both sides. It is also possible and more secure to
generate four keys for both sides. With four keys, there are keys for sending HMAC,
receiving HMAC, encrypting a message and decrypting a message. Regardless of
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the number of the used keys, when using static keys, the keys have to be securely
distributed for the both sides. Using pre-shared keys is generally thought as not
secure. However, the security of pre-shared keys can be increased by keeping the
lifetime of the keys short and generating new keys often. [44] Authentication and
encryption with static keys, identical keys on both sides can also be called symmetric
encryption.
The second security model is TLS. TLS is Secure Socket Layer’s (SSL) successor
and it has become a de facto standard for authentication and encryption in Internet.
[43, 45] TLS is used by almost everyone and everyday in modern web browsing.
During authentication with TLS, both sides are exchanging certificates with each
other. Certificates have to be signed by mutually trusted Certificate Authority (CA).
TLS is using asymmetric encryption, which in this case means, that both sides have
two encryption keys: public and private. The public key is shared with the other
side, and the messages are encrypted using the recipient’s public key. The keys are
generated in a way that only the private key of the recipient is able to decrypt the
message. [43, 44]
4.4.2 OpenSSH
SSH is a protocol originally developed by Tatu Ylönen in 1995. SSH provides
means for securely logging into remote computer over the network. SSH initiates
a remote terminal shell, that can be used for example to run commands on the
remote computer. OpenSSH is a software implementation of SSH, and it was initially
released in 1999 [46]. SSH is using client-server architecture. For creating the SSH
tunnel and logging in to the remote computer, the remote computer has to have a
SSH server running. [47] Figure 4.5 presents the message flow between the OpenSSH
client and server. The message encryption is done by OpenSSH, and it is completely
transparent for the user.
OpenSSH
NI
OpenSSH
NIInternet
Client Server
Figure 4.5. OpenSSH
When connecting with SSH, the server and client need to have their cryptographic
keys generated. SSH uses asymmetric encryption, so both client and server will
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have two keys, private and public. By default, OpenSSH (version 7.8) generates the
cryptographic keys by using Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem. Other
options are: Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) and Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The
security of diﬀerent key generation algorithms is not evaluated in this thesis. [48, 47]
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5. TRIAL SYSTEM AND MEASUREMENTS
Chosen technologies for the wireless mission data transfer system will be examined
by estimating the received signal strength and measuring the data throughput of
the system. As stated in chapter 2, the final system will be deployed in a location
where the communication range of the system is roughly 30 meters. The attenuation
of the wireless signal will finally aﬀect the data throughput of the wireless system.
For estimating the data throughput before the actual measurements in this thesis,
the signal attenuation is evaluated. For evaluating the signal attenuation, diﬀerent
channel models are introduced.
5.1 Channel Models and Link Budget Analysis
The equipment used in testing the wireless mission data system, are supporting
maximum bandwidth of 80 MHz. 802.11ac also operates only at 5-6 GHz frequencies.
Due to these facts, only WLAN channels located at 5-6 GHz and with 80 MHz
channel width for gaining maximum throughput are used.
The IEEE TGax task group has defined channel models based on ITU-R channel
models [49]. In this thesis, channel model for outdoor with LOS propagation is
considered as the closest channel model for the final deployment environment. The
designed wireless system will only be operable when both the AP and STA are
stationary. This means that the eﬀects caused by relative movement between the AP
and STA, like Doppler spread can be ignored [50]. The channel models defined IEEE
TGax are created for 802.11ax, but they should be also applicable for 802.11ac. The
same channel model can also be found from reference [51], and it is named as LOS
Urban Micro (UMi) channel model. The TGax and 3rd. Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) have defined an outdoor Path Loss (PL) model for a LOS link as:
𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑑) = 22.0 log10(𝑑) + 28 + 20 log10(𝑓𝑐), 𝑖𝑓 10𝑚 ⩽ 𝑑 < 𝑑𝐵𝑃 (5.1)
𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑆(𝑑) = 40 log10(𝑑)+7.8−18 log10(ℎ𝐴𝑃−1.0)−18 log10(ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴−1.0)+20 log10(𝑓𝑐),
𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝐵𝑃 ⩽ 𝑑 < 5000𝑚 (5.2)
where 𝑑 is the distance between AP and STA, ℎ𝐴𝑃 and ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴 are the antenna heights
of AP and STA, 𝑓𝑐 is the center carrier frequency in gigahertz (GHz) and 𝑑𝐵𝑃 is
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the Breakpoint (BP) distance. BP is a term used for the distance after which the
propagated signal starts to attenuate drastically. BP distance is aﬀected by frequency,
antenna heights and objects that are in close proximity of the LOS signal path [52].
The BP distance can be calculated as:
𝑑𝐵𝑃 =
4(ℎ𝐴𝑃 − 1.0)(ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴 − 1.0)𝑓𝑐 × 10
9
𝑐
(5.3)
where 𝑐 = 3 × 108 (m/s), which denotes the speed of light.
It can be noticed that by substituting values ℎ𝐴𝑃 and ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴 from Figure 2.2 to the
equation 5.3, the breakpoint distance becomes zero. Breakpoint distance becomes
zero, because the eﬀective antenna heights are calculated from the actual antenna
heights. For this channel model, the eﬀective environment height of 1 m is substracted
from the actual antenna height and this results in zero value, if either the ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴 or
ℎ𝐴𝑃 is 1 m. Giving that at the moment, the ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴 antenna height of 1 m was just
a fair assumption, it might be beneficial to find out the BP distance and the PL
with this channel model using suitable antenna heights. Let’s assume that the used
antenna heights are 10 m for the ℎ𝐴𝑃 and 2 m for the ℎ𝑆𝑇𝐴. Substituting these values
and a 𝑓𝑐 of 5.5 GHz in to the equation 5.3, the 𝑑𝐵𝑃 becomes 660 m. This BP distance
implicates that within the ranges of the communication system in this thesis, the BP
distance is not exceeded under any circumstances. Because of this, the PL can be
calculated with equation 5.1. The resulted PL values are shown in Table 5.1. The
PL model was defined for distances between 10 m and the BP, so distances under 10
m are not shown.
Table 5.1. Path loss at diﬀerent distances and frequencies using TGax’s outdoor
LOS channel model
PL (dB) 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m
5.530 Ghz 64.9 68.7 71.5 73.6 75.4
5.610 Ghz 65.0 68.9 71.6 73.7 75.5
The simplest channel path loss model is the Free Space Loss (FSL). FSL defines the
signal loss in decibels at the given distance when there are no obstacles. The FSL is
often used as a basic reference for the path loss. In [53] the FSL is given as:
𝐹𝑆𝐿 = 20 log10(𝑑) + 20 log10(𝑓𝑐) + 32.4 (5.4)
where 𝑑 is the distance between AP and STA in kilometers (km) and 𝑓𝑐 is the center
carrier frequency in megahertz (MHz). It can be seen that the antenna heights will
not aﬀect the FSL.
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Table 5.2 shows FSL for every continuous WLAN channel that is allowed for outdoor
use in Finland and located at 5-6 GHz for distances between 1m and 30m [11]. Even
that the diﬀerences in the FSL between these frequencies are not significant, it can
be seen that the FSL gets higher as the frequency gets higher.
Table 5.2. Free space loss at diﬀerent distances and frequencies using FSL channel
model
FSL (dB) 1m 5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m
5.530 Ghz 47.3 61.3 67.3 70.1 73.3 75.3 76.8
5.610 Ghz 47.4 61.4 67.4 70.1 73.4 75.4 77.0
By comparing values in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that the PL values with
FSL are higher than the ones with TGax’s channel model. Because the TGax’s
channel model is much more specific and it is created almost explicitly for the given
situation, PL values calculated with TGax’s channel model are used.
Based on PL that was calculated with diﬀerent channel models, link budget of the
Wi-Fi communication link can be calculated. Link budget calculations are basic
calculations used in estimating the range and the quality of wireless communications
and it involves summing all the gains and losses between the transmitter and the
receiver. Usually link budget calculations are used to find out the received signal
strength. With knowledge of the receiver’s sensitivity, the transmitting power can be
adjusted to achieve suitable signal strength at the receiver. In this thesis, appropriate
formula for logarithmic link budget calculations could be:
𝑃𝑅𝑋 = 𝑃𝑇𝑋 − 𝐿𝑇𝑋 + 𝐺𝑇𝑋 − 𝐿𝑃𝐿 + 𝐺𝑅𝑋 − 𝐿𝑅𝑋 (5.5)
where 𝑃𝑅𝑋 is the signal strength at receiver, 𝑃𝑇𝑋 is the 𝑇𝑋 power, 𝐿𝑇𝑋 is a loss that
constitutes of cable and connector losses at the transmitter, 𝐺𝑇𝑋 is the antenna gain
at transmitter, 𝐿𝑃𝐿 is the PL for the wireless channel, 𝐺𝑅𝑋 is the receiver’s antenna
gain and 𝐿𝑅𝑋 are the cable and connector losses at the receiver.
The transmitting power of the used Wi-Fi transceiver is 15 dBm, when 80 MHz
channel and 3 spatial streams are used [54]. The antennas that are in use at the
transmitter oﬀer 7 dBi antenna gain [55]. At the receiver, the antenna gains are
not known but a 5 dBi gain would be a fair assumption. The cable and connector
losses could not be measured for this thesis, but the length of the cables on both
transmitter and receiver is less than 30cm. For the cable and connector losses, an
assumption of 3dB loss is made for both transmitter and receiver. With these values
and a PL calculated with TGax’s channel model and, the received signal strength
with 5.530 GHz center frequency at 30 m distance becomes -54.4 dBm.
It would be useful to compare the calculated received signal strength to the receiver
sensitivity reported by device manufacturer. However, the manufacturers of the used
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devices are not informing these values. For this reason the received signal strength
is compared to the sensitivity values that are specified at IEEE 802.11ac standard.
The 802.11ac standard specifies minimum receiver sensitivities for diﬀerent MCS
rates. The values are telling the minimum level for the receiver’s input signal that
has to be demodulated with a maximum of 10% Packet Error Rate (PER). Table 5.3
shows the minimum 802.11ac receiver sensitivities that have been specified in the
IEEE 802.11ac standard. [8]
Table 5.3. IEEE 802.11ac minimum receiver sensitivities for 80 MHz channel
MCS Minimum Sensitivity (dBm)
0 -76
1 –73
2 –71
3 –68
4 –64
5 –60
6 –59
7 –58
8 –53
9 –51
From Table 5.3 can be seen that with received signal level of -54.4 dBm that was
calculated earlier, the standard specifies that the maximum achievable MCS would
be MCS 7. It must be noted that the standard really specifies the minimum values,
and the devices’ sensitivities can be better (i.e lower) than the values in Table 5.3.
Declarations for MCS rates in 802.11ac can be seen from Table 3.5. 80 MHz channel
bandwidth, short GI length, three spatial streams and MCS 7 would result in 975.0
Mb/s PHY throughput. The data rate at PHY layer often diﬀers much from the
actual achieved throughput. This partly results from the MAC layer’s efficiency,
which is usually not higher than 70 %. With 975.0 Mb/s PHY data rate, the achieved
throughput could be up to 682.5 Mb/s. [27]
5.2 Test Equipment
The test equipment consist of two PCs and a wireless AP. The first PC is just an
ordinary laptop and it is connected to the AP via Ethernet. From now on, this
laptop is just referred as PC. The second PC is the DTD, which is used for data
recording in the Grob aircraft, this PC is from now on referred as DTD. The wireless
connectivity for the DTD is achieved with a wireless network adapter. The wireless
network adapter chosen for the task is SparkLAN WPEQ-353ACNI. The wireless
adapter is connected to the DTD with Mini Peripheral Component Interconnect
Express (mPCIe). The SparkLAN WPEQ-353ACNI was chosen for its support for
IEEE 802.11ac with the maximum of three spatial streams. The maximum achievable
throughput for this wireless adapter is (in theory) 1.3 Gb/s at PHY layer. The
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Sparklan WPEQ-353ACNI is configured as a STA, so the DTD works as a STA
during the tests. The SparkLAN WPEQ-353ACNI is based on Qualcomm Atheros
QCA9890-BR4B chipset [54]. The hardware specifications of PC and DTD are shown
in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. Specifications of DTD and PC
DTD PC
CPU Intel Celeron J1900 Intel Xeon E3-150M v5
RAM 2 GB 32 GB
OS Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
The wireless AP chosen for the tests is ASUS RT-AC68U, which also supports
IEEE 802.11ac and a maximum of three spatial streams. The Asus RT-AC68U uses
Broadcom’s BCM4360 Wi-Fi transceiver. The ASUS RT-AC68U is configured to
wireless AP mode, so it also provides the IP routing services for the clients. The PC
and DTD are configured to the same subnet. The wireless access point is set to use
only 802.11ac standard, and the 2.4 GHz radio is turned oﬀ. The wireless security
is configured to use WPA2-PSK (WPA2-Personal) that uses CCMP encryption.
WPA2-Personal is used instead of WPA2-Enterprise for easier setup. The encryption
algorithms used by WPA2-Personal and WPA2-Enterprise are the same, the only
diﬀerence is the used authentication method. From now on, WPA2-Personal with
CCMP encryption is referred as WPA2. Conceptual image of the test system is
shown in Figure 5.1
DTD
PC
AP
Ethernet
Wi-Fi
Figure 5.1. The test system
5.2.1 Configuration of OpenSSH and OpenVPN
Following paragraphs will introduce the used configurations for the OpenSSH and
OpenVPN servers and clients. These configurations were used in the tests. It is also
introduced how the encryption keys are distributed from the server to the client.
OpenSSH server is running on the PC, and the DTD is configured as a OpenSSH
client. Server and client are configured to use public key authentication. The key-pair
was created on the OpenSSH server using command ssh-keygen. This command is
used to create the key-pair that includes the private and public key. By default the
used OpenSSH version (OpenSSH 7.6) generates a 2048-bit RSA keys, which are
used in tests. The public key is appended to a file called authorized_keys with the
following command
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$ cat id_rsa.pub >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
The authorized_keys file is used to store public keys for every client that is allowed to
initiate SSH connection. The private key is then transferred to the DTD with USB
memory stick. Usually with SSH the key exchange is executed another way around.
Meaning that the client generates the key pair, and the public key is then transferred
to the server, usually with SSH. In this scenario, the USB memory stick can be
thought as a secure transfer media and it can be used to transfer the private key for
the client. The location and the name of the private key file on the client can be
configured case-by-case. After the public key has been added to the server, and the
corresponding private key has been transferred to the server, client is able to connect
to the server with SSH without password authentication. The used OpenSSH server
configuration is:
PubKeyAuthentication yes
PasswordAuthentication no
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
Server configuration tells OpenSSH server to enable public key authentication, disable
password authentication and tells the location of the file that has the authorized
hosts’ public keys. Used configuration for the OpenSSH client is:
Host *
PubkeyAuthentication yes
PasswordAuthentication no
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Client configuration tells OpenSSH client to apply the configurations for every host,
enable public key authentication, disable password authentication and specifies the
location of the client’s private key.
With OpenVPN, the server is again running on the PC, and the DTD is configured as
a OpenVPN client. In these measurements, the OpenVPN server is configured simply
to create point-to-point tunnel between the server and client and server. Virtual
TUN interfaces are used for creating the tunnel. For authentication, static keys are
used. This means that one key is generated in the server and then transferred to
the DTD same way as with SSH. The same static key is used for encrypting and
decrypting messages in both ends. The static key is generated with command
$ openvpn --genkey --secret static.key
Here the static.key is the name of the generated key. The used configuration for the
OpenVPN server is:
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dev tun
ifconfig 10.8.0.5 10.8.0.6
secret static.key
The server configuration tells OpenVPN to create a TUN interface and assign the
IP addresses for the server and the client. Secret static.key tells the name and the
location of the encryption key. The used configuration for OpenVPN client is:
remote 192.168.1.5
dev tun
ifconfig 10.8.0.6 10.8.0.5
secret.static key
Client configuration specifies the IP address of the OpenVPN server, creates the
TUN interface, assigns the IP addresses and tells the name and the location of the
encryption key.
5.3 Test Environment
Throughput tests will be executed outside and in open space. Diﬀerent communication
distances will be tested by altering the distance between the AP and the DTD. The
communication distances to test between the AP and DTD were chosen as 1 m, 15
m and 30 m. The 1 m distance was chosen to find out the maximum achievable
throughput of the system. The 30 m distance is very close to the range of the wireless
mission data transfer system when it is finally implemented, so this distance is the
most interesting one. 15 m distance was chosen from between of these distances.
The biggest interest in this thesis is the uplink performance of the wireless system.
So the throughput from the DTD to the PC is the most intriguing part and thus
mainly tested.
The antenna heights in tests diﬀer from the antenna heights that were presented in
Figure 2.2. To make measurements easier to conduct, the AP and DTD are placed
on a level surface and the antenna heights for both are 1 m. Conceptual image of
the test environment is shown in Figure 5.2.
1m, 15m, 30m
1m
DTD AP
1m
Figure 5.2. Conceptual image of the test environment
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5.4 Test Procedures
Throughput will be measured with iPerf3. IPerf3 is an open source command line tool
that can be used to test network throughput using UPD, TCP or Stream Transmit
Protocol (SCTP). IPerf3 is used to log the achieved throughput once per second.
Every measurement lasts for 60 seconds. In this thesis, TCP is mainly used for the
throughput tests. UDP tests are performed only with WPA2, without OpenSSH and
OpenVPN. The basic diﬀerence between TCP and UDP is that TCP is connection
based protocol and UDP is connectionless. TCP provides packet error detection,
and errors can be corrected with retransmissions. UDP does not quarantee that the
recipient receives packets in right order and without errors. For this reason UDP
would not be a probable protocol choice in the final system.
The throughput of the test system will be measured with WPA2, WPA2 with
OpenSSH tunnel and WPA2 with OpenVPN tunnel. Measurements will be executed
for the three communication distances. The quality of the wireless link can be moni-
tored with a linux command line tool called Wavemon. Wavemon gives information
about the received signal strength and the RX rate at DTD, which is constituted
of the used MCS, bandwidth, GI length and the number of spatial streams. Un-
fortunately the used device driver for the DTD’s wireless adapter, Ath10k, does
not share information about the used TX rate. The used Ath10k driver version is
10.2.4-1.000037. The transmitter and receiver are not necessarily using same RX
and TX rates. Even that they are not, it is interesting to monitor the RX rate of
the DTD if it would give some clue about the used TX rate. TX and RX rates can’t
be set manually, the rates are modified automatically by DTD and AP based on
the channel conditions. Also the AP does not share information about the received
signal strength, so it is only possible to monitor the received signal strength at the
DTD.
Prior to official tests, it was found out that the TCP congestion control is causing
troubles for the throughput tests. TCP congestion control is trying to maximize the
throughput of the network by reducing the TCP packet size if there are errors or the
network is congested. Correspondingly the TCP packet size should grow if there are
no errors. [56]. The problems were related to too small TCP congestion window,
which caused low throughput between the DTD and PC. The TCP congestion window
is adjusted by the sender, and the problems occurred when sending packets from
DTD to PC. Several congestion control algorithms were tested, and the best results
were obtained with a congestion control algorithm called Reno. For this reason, Reno
algorithm is used for TCP congestion control in DTD.
With iPerf3, by default the data flows from client to the server and the main interest
is in the uplink throughput from DTD to PC. For this reason the iPerf3 server
process is always started on the PC and the client on the DTD. The iPerf3 server is
started with command:
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$ iperf3 -s
5.4.1 WPA2
With WPA2 only, best results were obtained by starting the iPerf3 client with
command:
$ iperf3 -c 192.168.1.5 -P 128 -w 200k -t 30
Here the -c stands for client operation mode, after which the server’s IP address is
given. -P 128 means that 128 TCP connections is created in parallel and option -w
200k tries to set the transmit and receive buﬀer sizes. -t 30 tells that the test lasts
for 30 seconds.
With WPA2 only it is also possible to measure UDP throughput with iPerf3. For
UDP measurements, the iPerf3 client was started with command:
$ iperf3 -c 192.168.1.5 -P 5 -w 200k -u -b 1300M -t 30
Here the parameter -u tells iPerf3 to used UDP protocol and -b 1300M sets the
target throughput to 1300 Mb/s, which is the maximum achievable throughput of
the system.
5.4.2 WPA2 and OpenSSH
To test iPerf3 with WPA and OpenSSH, an OpenSSH tunnel has to be created for
the task. OpenSSH allows to forward local port to remote host’s port with command:
$ ssh -L 5201:192.168.1.5:5201 mikko@192.168.1.5
This command uses OpenSSH to connect local port number 5201 to remote host’s
port number 5201. The port 5201 was chosen because it is the default port for iPerf3
server. For authentication and encryption OpenSSH uses the previously generated
and distributed keys. After creating the OpenSSH tunnel, the iPerf3 server has to
be started on the PC with the same command as before. The command for starting
the iPerf3 client and using the OpenSSH tunnel is:
$ iperf3 -c localhost
IPerf3 now uses localhost’s port 5201, that is forwarded to PC’s port 5201 via
OpenSSH. Other command line parameters of iPerf3 didn’t aﬀect the throughput
positively. UDP traffic doesn’t work via OpenSSH tunnel with this configuration, so
it is not tested.
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5.4.3 WPA2 and OpenVPN
For WPA2 with OpenVPN tunnel tests, the OpenVPN server and client has to be
set up. This can be done by command:
$ openvpn <configuration file>
The configuration file for OpenVPN is given here, and the same command works for
both server and client. After starting the OpenVPN server and client, the iPerf3
server can be started on the PC. The iPerf3 client on the DTD is started with
command:
$ iperf3 -c 10.8.0.5
Now the iPerf3 client is connected to the server on 10.8.0.5:5201. Using UDP instead
of TCP, parallel connections or altering the buﬀer sizes did not aﬀect the throughput
with WPA2 and OpenVPN.
5.5 Results
Results are presented in subsections, every tested communication distance has its
own subsection. Tests that were introduced in the previous section are performed
for every communication distance.
5.5.1 1 Meter Distance
Figure 5.3 presents the achieved throughput with 1m distance between the AP and
DTD. In these tests, the DTD reported that RX rate of 866.7 Mb/s was used. This
RX rate comprises of MCS 9, 80 MHz bandwidth, short GI and two spatial streams.
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Figure 5.3. Throughput at 1 m distance
The results are quite consistent, but there can be seen a drop in the throughput with
WPA2 + OpenSSH. TCP traffic with WPA2 + OpenVPN tunnel resulted in steady
100 Mb/s throughput.
5.5.2 15 Meter Distance
Figure 5.4 presents the achieved throughput with 15 m distance between the AP and
DTD. In these tests, the DTD reported RX rate of 585.0 Mb/s, which consists of
MCS 4, 80 MHz bandwidth, short GI and three spatial streams.
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Figure 5.4. Throughput at 15 m distance
Results from 15 m distance are not greatly diﬀerent than the results from 1 m
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distance. TCP throughput with WPA2 was actually higher than at 1 m distance,
but there are bigger falls and the throughput isn’t as steady as at 1 m. The WPA2
+ OpenSSH throughput started to drop sooner than in 1 m distance and it actually
dropped below the WPA2 + OpenVPN throughput.
5.5.3 30 Meter Distance
Figure 5.5 presents the achieved throughput with 30 m distance between the AP and
DTD. In these tests, the DTD reported that RX rate of 585.0 Mb/s was used. This
RX rate is the same as in tests at 15 m distance.
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Figure 5.5. Throughput at 30 m distance
The results in Figure 5.5 show that the throughput dropped for every test as the
distance went from 15 m to 30 m, except for WPA2 + OpenVPN with TCP traffic.
5.6 Result Analysis
Results show that the throughput of WPA2 + OpenSSH with TCP traffic drops
drastically even though the channel conditions remain the same. This phenomenon
results most likely from the used protocols. As the OpenSSH (and SSH altogether)
is using TCP, and in these tests the test traffic was created with iPerf3 using TCP,
this result could be anticipated. In general, using TCP over TCP is bad practice,
especially in lossy networks. The drop in TCP throughput is called TCP meltdown
[57]. The achieved throughput before it drops (i.e the first 10 seconds of each test)
can be thought as the real performance of WPA2 + OpenSSH tunnel, because the
drop in the throughput doesn’t result from OpenSSH itself. OpenSSH adds overhead
and as a result the throughput reduces by approximately 100 Mb/s.
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From results in Figure 5.4 can be seen that the RX rate that DTD reported can’t
correlate with the used TX rate. The achieved throughput with UDP is 566.0 Mb/s
in average, so the used TX rate has to be higher than the reported RX rate, which
was 585.0 Mb/s. The reported RX rate is the maximum throughput at the PHY
layer, and the achieved average throughput at transport layer (UDP) is only about
20 Mb/s lower. As stated in subsection 5.1, the efficiency of the MAC layer is roughly
70 %. Contradictions between the reported RX rate and the possible TX rate lead to
a conclusion that the RX and TX rates are not comparable, and it is not reasonable
to further compare these rates.
At every tested distance the throughput of WPA2 + OpenVPN remained more or
less the same, and the achieved throughput was about 100 Mb/s. When looking
into the cause of this, it was found out that the OpenVPN tunneling causes high
load for Central Processing Unit (CPU) on both server and client. During the
tests, OpenVPN server process consumed 25% of the PC’s CPU, and the OpenVPN
client process consumed 99% of the DTD’s CPU. For this reason, it can be said
that the DTD’s CPU performance is most likely restricting the WPA2 + OpenVPN
throughput. After finding out how CPU intensive the OpenVPN was, brief tests were
performed to find out how much OpenSSH stresses the CPU’s of the DTD and PC.
The result was that OpenSSH stresses the DTD’s CPU 25% during the throughput
test with iPerf3. At PC the CPU usage was far less, only 10%.
At 30 m distance, the average throughput with UDP was 447.0 Mb/s. If the 70 %
MAC layer efficiency is taken into account, the resulted data rate at PHY layer is
639.0 Mb/s. Based on the link budget calculations presented in subsection 5.1, the
maximum achievable PHY layer data rate at 30 m distance is 975.0 Mb/s. From
these results, it can be seen that the link budget calculations were not quite accurate.
Basically this means that the used MCS could have been MCS 5 instead of the MCS
7, that was the maximum achievable MCS rate based on the link budget calculations.
When comparing the results from 30 m distance to the set requirements for the
wireless mission data system, it can be found out, if the performance of the designed
system is sufficient or not. Table 5.5 shows the transfer times for 4 GB of data
with the tested protocols. UDP is not listed because UDP can’t be used as is to
reliably transfer data. UDP tests were executed to find out the maximum achievable
throughput of the system, and to be able to assess the overheads caused by TCP,
OpenSSH and OpenVPN. The throughput values that were used in the calculations
were 300 Mb/s for WPA2, 200 Mb/s for WPA2 + OpenSSH and 100 Mb/s for WPA2
+ OpenVPN.
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Table 5.5. Results vs. requirements
Used protocols Time to transfer 4 GB of data
WPA2 1 min 49 s
WPA2 + OpenSSH 2 min 43 s
WPA2 + OpenVPN 5 min 27 s
From Table 5.5 can be seen that the throughputs with WPA2 only and WPA2 +
OpenSSH would fulfill the requirements. The requirement was that the system has
to transfer 4 GB of data in 5 minutes. The WPA2 + OpenVPN also comes pretty
close to fulfill the requirements.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The target of this thesis was to design a wireless mission data transfer system
for use with FINAF’s Grob aircraft. Thesis concentrated on the selection of the
wireless communication technology and the security of the wireless communication.
After brief evaluation Wi-Fi standards were recognized as promising technologies for
implementing the wireless mission data transfer system, based on their high data
rates and the low prices of the equipment.
The Wi-Fi standard used in this thesis for the trial system and measurements, IEEE
802.11ac could provide sufficient throughput for transferring the mission data, but
the results achieved in this thesis will only apply for a single STA. In the final
implementation, there might be up to 5 Grob aircraft simultaneously using the
wireless mission data system.
The upcoming IEEE 802.11ax standard will bring new features, like for example the
UL MU-MIMO, which would be almost essential feature for the wireless mission
data transfer system. At the time of writing this thesis, first consumer grade devices
based on draft 3.0 version of IEEE 802.11ax standard are starting to roll out. The
draft 3.0 version of IEEE 802.11ax was released in June 2018. The first devices that
are starting to roll out are wireless routers, but there are yet no wireless network
adapters that could have been used in this thesis instead of the Sparklan adapter.
At the moment 802.11ax seems like a very good option for the technology choice to
implement the wireless mission data transfer system.
Link budget calculations couldn’t be exploited properly for the tested system. The
used equipment did not have enough options for monitoring the used TX powers nor
the received signal strengths. If the system will be further tested, at least the AP has
to be chosen diﬀerently. The Asus RT-AC68U that was used during measurements
in this thesis did not allow choosing the WLAN channels freely. Because of this, the
WLAN frequencies that are intended for outdoor use, and thus allow using higher TX
powers could not be used. The WLAN frequencies for outside use in Finland allow a
maximum TX power of 30 dBm (1 W) EIRP, which means that the radiated power
including antenna gain can’t exceed 30 dBm. The wireless network adapter used in
this thesis had the maximum 𝑇𝑋 power of 15 dBm when using 80 MHz channel and
three spatial streams. With antenna gain the EIRP was increased to 22 dBm. It
can be said that with devices that would support higher 𝑇𝑋 powers and allowing to
freely choose the used channels, the throughput of the system could be potentially
increased.
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There were also problems with the TCP congestion control, and the results even at 1
m distance didn’t come close to the theoretical maximum throughput of the used
devices (1.3 Gb/s). There is no doubt that after further research and configuration
the throughtput results could be better. It also must be noted that the Ethernet
connection between the AP and the PC was a Gigabit Ethernet (GbE) connection.
The GbE connection didn’t restrict the throughput in the measurements in this
thesis, but in the final implementation the wired connection between the AP and
the GS server has to be taken into account.
If the wireless communication is secured with either of the proposed methods,
OpenSSH or OpenVPN, the USB memory stick can be used to safely distribute
the encryption keys as described in section 5.2. The keys would be generated with
a server computer that is a part of GS. Even if the system would use static or
symmetric encryption keys, the system could be thought secure if the lifetime of
the keys is kept short. Encryption keys can be generated so that every client (Grob
aircraft in this case) would have a unique encryption key, and the key would be valid
only for one mission.
In addition to the wireless communication technology and the additional security
measures like OpenSSH or OpenVPN, the wireless mission data transfer system
needs software implementation to actually transfer the files from the aircraft to the
GS or the other way. With OpenSSH, for example scp or rsync could be used to
transfer files. Scp is a file copy program implemented by OpenSSH [48] and rsync is
a program that can be used to synchronize or transfer files between two computers
e.g through SSH tunnel. With WPA2 only and with OpenVPN, some kind of file
server system could be used. For the file transfer there are multiple options.
Even though that it was mentioned in chapter 5.6, that UDP can’t be used as is to
reliably transfer data, it would be be interesting to find out the performance of UDP
transmission, if the error detection and correction would be implemented by hand.
If the wireless mission data transfer system is further examined in the future, this
could be a part of the study.
When the wireless mission data transfer system is finally implemented, it has to
made sure that the system does not cause RF emissions during the flight. If the final
system is using Linux as operating system, one possibility is to use a Linux kernel
feature called rfkill. Rfkill can be used to turn oﬀ radio devices with software. Some
radio devices actually have a hardware switch that can be toggled with rfkill. Even
if the rfkill would be available to use, its behaviour would have to be verified with
additional tests and measurements. [58]
Other options for the wireless mission data transfer system should also be considered,
if the time window that was specified to be 5 min proves to be too long, and the data
should be transferred faster. One possibility is to use the existing physical transfer
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media, which is the USB memory stick in this case, to transfer the large video files.
Wireless part of the mission data transfer system could still be used for transferring
the mission briefing data to the aircraft, and for transferring the flight parameters to
the ground station after the flight. Wireless mission data transfer system could also
be used for fleet management purposes, that could include for example uploading
new software versions for the MFD. The use case of the wireless mission data transfer
system is heavily dependent on the length of the time window that can be used to
transfer data. Because the requirements for the wireless mission data transfer system
were not explicitly specified, it can’t be unambiguously stated whether the designed
system is usable or not.
In this thesis, the wireless mission data transfer system was designed around the
data recorder of Grob aircraft, which was referred as DTD. However, anything that
is presented in thesis isn’t necessarily bound to the DTD. This means that the
techniques presented in this thesis could be easily used with another platform and/or
other devices. Despite the used platform and devices, based on the results it can be
said that in the final system has to balance between the level of security, and the
time that is used for data transfer.
52
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Ilmavoimat. Grob G 115E. 2018. url: https://ilmavoimat.fi/documents/
1951206/2016308/Ilmavoimat+-konetyyppitietoja+Grob+G115E+%287_18%
29.pdf/515dd33e-5e34-4865-887b-67c238c39ba4/Ilmavoimat+-konetyyppitietoja+
Grob+G115E+%287_18%29.pdf.pdf.
[2] Ilmavoimat. Valmet L-70 Vinka. 2018. url: https://ilmavoimat.fi/documents/
1951206/2016308/Ilmavoimat+-+konetyyppitietoja+Valmet+L-70+Vinka+
%281_18%29.pdf/26daacdc-796b-4671-8478-67e86e713147/Ilmavoimat+-
+konetyyppitietoja+Valmet+L-70+Vinka+%281_18%29.pdf.pdf.
[3] J. Virtanen and J.M Taskinen. Patria Aviation Oy, Tikkakoski. Interview on
15.2.2018. 2018.
[4] Eldad Perahia and Robert Stacey. “Next Generation Wireless LANs - 802.11n
and 802.11ac, second edition”. In: Wiley-IEEE Standards Association, 2013.
isbn: 978-1-107-01676-7.
[5] 5G new radio network. Nokia. 2018. url: https://onestore.nokia.com/asset/
205407 (visited on 10/18/2018).
[6] Nokia. Private LTE. 2018. url: https://networks.nokia.com/solutions/private-
lte (visited on 10/25/2018).
[7] 3GPP Jeanette Wannstrom. LTE Advanced. 2013. url: http://www.3gpp.org/
technologies/keywords-acronyms/97-lte-advanced (visited on 10/25/2018).
[8] Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer
(PHY) Specifications: Amendment 4: Enhancements for Very High Throughput
for Operation in Bands below 6 GHz. Tech. rep. New York, USA: IEEE
Standards Association, 2013.
[9] Abhaykumar Kumbhar. “Overview of ISM Bands and Software-Defined Radio
Experimentation”. In: Wireless Personal Communications 97.3 (Dec. 2017),
pp. 3743–3756. issn: 1572-834X. doi: 10 . 1007/ s11277 - 017 - 4696 - z. url:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-017-4696-z.
[10] Ho Quang-Dung, Daniel Tweed, and Le-Ngoc Tho. “Requirements and Reg-
ulations in the 5 GHz Unlicensed Spectrum”. In: Long Term Evolution in
Unlicensed Bands. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 11–20.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53
isbn: 978-3-319-47346-8. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-47346-8_2. url: https:
//doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47346-8_2.
[11] Viestintävirasto. Taajuusjakotaulukko. Finnish. 2018. url: https : / /www .
viestintavirasto.fi/attachments/maaraykset/Taajuusjakotaulukko_suomi_3.1.
2018.pdf.
[12] John Terry and Juha Heiskala. “OFDM Wireless LANS: A Theoretical and
Practical Guide”. In: 2001. isbn: 978-0-672-32157-3.
[13] Hermann Rohling. “OFDM Concepts for Future Communication Systems”. In:
2011. isbn: 978-3-642-17495-7.
[14] Hermann Rohling. “Multi-Carrier Techniques for Broadband Wireless Commu-
nications”. In: 2007. url: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tut/detail.
action?docID=1085263.
[15] Li Ye. “Basic Concepts”. In: Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing for
Wireless Communications. Ed. by Li Ye and Stuber Gordon. Boston, MA:
Springer US, 2006, pp. 19–46. isbn: 978-0-387-30235-5. doi: 10.1007/0-387-
30235-2_2. url: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-30235-2_2.
[16] H. Yin and S. Alamouti. “OFDMA: A Broadband Wireless Access Technology”.
In: 2006 IEEE Sarnoﬀ Symposium. Mar. 2006, pp. 1–4. doi: 10.1109/SARNOF.
2006.4534773.
[17] Hermann Lipfert. “MIMO OFDM Space Time Coding – Spatial Multiplexing
Increasing Performance and Spectral Efficiency in Wireless Systems”. In: 2007.
[18] Ahmed Bannour and Matin Abdul Mohammad. “Coding for MIMO-OFDM in
Future Wireless Systems”. In: 2015. isbn: 978-3-319-19152-2. doi: https://doi-
org.libproxy.tut.fi/10.1007/978-3-319-19153-9. url: https://ebookcentral.
proquest.com/lib/tut/detail.action?docID=1085263.
[19] Aki Hakkarainen. I/Q Imbalance in Multiantenna Systems: Modeling, Analysis
and RF-Aware Digital Beamforming. Tampere University of Technology. Publi-
cation. Tampere University of Technology, Jan. 2017. isbn: 978-952-15-3871-1.
[20] A. Hakkarainen et al. “Widely-linear beamforming and RF impairment suppres-
sion in massive antenna arrays”. In: Journal of Communications and Networks
15.4 (Aug. 2013), pp. 383–397. issn: 1229-2370. doi: 10.1109/JCN.2013.000069.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 54
[21] H. Lou et al. “A comparison of implicit and explicit channel feedback methods
for MU-MIMO WLAN systems”. In: 2013 IEEE 24th Annual International
Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC).
Sept. 2013, pp. 419–424. doi: 10.1109/PIMRC.2013.6666172.
[22] G. R. Hiertz et al. “The IEEE 802.11 universe”. In: IEEE Communications
Magazine 48.1 (Jan. 2010), pp. 62–70. issn: 0163-6804. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.
2010.5394032.
[23] Wi-Fi Alliance introduces Wi-Fi 6. Wi-Fi, Newsroom. 2018. url: https://
www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/wi-fi-alliance-introduces-wi-fi-6 (visited
on 10/06/2018).
[24] Bob O’Hara and Al Petrick. “Medium access control (MAC)”. In: IEEE 802.11
Handbook:A Designer 39s Companion. Wiley-IEEE Standards Association,
2005. isbn: 9781118098851. doi: 10.1109/9781118098851.ch3. url: https:
//ieeexplore-ieee-org.libproxy.tut.fi/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5769880.
[25] Kevin J. Negus and Al Petrick. “History of wireless local area networks
(WLANs) in the unlicensed bands”. In: Info : the Journal of Policy, Reg-
ulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, Information and Media 11.5
(2009), pp. 36–56. issn: 1463-6697. url: https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.
tut.fi/docview/275033398?accountid=27303.
[26] L. Verma, M. Fakharzadeh, and S. Choi. “Wifi on steroids: 802.11ac and
802.11ad”. In: IEEE Wireless Communications 20.6 (Dec. 2013), pp. 30–35.
issn: 1536-1284. doi: 10.1109/MWC.2013.6704471.
[27] Cisco. “802.11ac: The Fifth Generation of Wi-Fi”. In: (2018), pp. 1–15. url:
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/aironet-
3600-series/white-paper-c11-713103.pdf.
[28] D. J. Deng et al. “IEEE 802.11ax: Highly Efficient WLANs for Intelligent
Information Infrastructure”. In: IEEE Communications Magazine 55.12 (Dec.
2017), pp. 52–59. issn: 0163-6804. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2017.1700285.
[29] National Instruments. “Introduction to 802.11ax High-Efficiency Wireless”. In:
(2018), pp. 1–10. url: ttp://www.ni.com/white-paper/53150/en/.
[30] Cisco. “IEEE 802.11ax: The Sixth Generation of Wi-Fi”. In: (2018), pp. 1–20.
url: https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/white-
paper-c11-740788.pdf.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55
[31] M. A. Abo-Soliman and M. A. Azer. “A study in WPA2 enterprise recent at-
tacks”. In: 2017 13th International Computer Engineering Conference (ICENCO).
Dec. 2017, pp. 323–330. doi: 10.1109/ICENCO.2017.8289808.
[32] M. Agarwal, S. Biswas, and S. Nandi. “Advanced Stealth Man-in-The-Middle
Attack in WPA2 Encrypted Wi-Fi Networks”. In: IEEE Communications
Letters 19.4 (Apr. 2015), pp. 581–584. issn: 1089-7798. doi: 10.1109/LCOMM.
2015.2400443.
[33] “IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks–Port-Based Network
Access Control”. In: IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 (Revision of IEEE Std 802.1X-2004)
(Feb. 2010), pp. 1–205. doi: 10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5409813.
[34] Edwin Lyle Brown. “Coding for MIMO-OFDM in Future Wireless Systems”.
In: 2006. isbn: 9781420044652.
[35] “Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements”. In:
IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 (2004), pp. 1–205. doi: 10 .1109/IEEESTD.2010 .
5409813.
[36] Alberto Bartoli et al. “Secure Configuration Practices of WPA2 Enterprise
Supplicants”. In: (2018).
[37] Jie Wang and Zachary A. Kissel. “Introduction to Network Security : Theory
and Practice.” In: 2015.
[38] Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens. “Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing
Nonce Reuse in WPA2”. In: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2017.
[39] Changhua He et al. “A Modular Correctness Proof of IEEE 802.11I and TLS”. In:
Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. CCS ’05. Alexandria, VA, USA: ACM, 2005, pp. 2–15. isbn: 1-
59593-226-7. doi: 10.1145/1102120.1102124. url: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
1102120.1102124.
[40] Jyh-Cheng Chen, Ming-Chia Jiang, and Yi-wen Liu. “Wireless LAN security
and IEEE 802.11i”. In: IEEE Wireless Communications 12.1 (Feb. 2005),
pp. 27–36. issn: 1536-1284. doi: 10.1109/MWC.2005.1404570.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56
[41] Wi-Fi Alliance. Wi-Fi Alliance® introduces Wi-Fi CERTIFIED WPA3™
security. 2018. url: https://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/wi-fi-
alliance-introduces-wi-fi-certified-wpa3-security.
[42] D. Harkins. “Simultaneous Authentication of Equals: A Secure, Password-Based
Key Exchange for Mesh Networks”. In: 2008 Second International Conference on
Sensor Technologies and Applications (sensorcomm 2008). Aug. 2008, pp. 839–
844. doi: 10.1109/SENSORCOMM.2008.131.
[43] Markus Feilner. “Building and Integrating Virtual Private Networks: Learn
How to Build Secure VPNs Using this Powerful Open Source Application”. In:
2006.
[44] Jon C. Snader. “VPNs illustrated: Tunnels, VPNn, and IPsec”. In: 2005. isbn:
0-321-24544-X.
[45] S. Turner. “Transport Layer Security”. In: IEEE Internet Computing 18.6 (Nov.
2014), pp. 60–63. issn: 1089-7801. doi: 10.1109/MIC.2014.126.
[46] OpenSSH. “OpenSSH Project History”. In: 18.6 (2018). url: https://www.
openssh.com/history.html.
[47] Richard E. Silverman Daniel J. Barrett. “SSH, the Secure Shell: The definitive
guide”. In: 2001. isbn: 0-596-00011-1.
[48] Michael Stahnke. “Pro OpenSSH”. In: 2006. isbn: 1-59059-476-2.
[49] IEEE. IEEE 802.11ax Channel Model Document. 2014. url: http://www.
ieee802.org/11/Reports/tgax_update.htm (visited on 10/30/2018).
[50] L. Krasny et al. “Doppler spread estimation in mobile radio systems”. In: IEEE
Communications Letters 5.5 (May 2001), pp. 197–199. issn: 1089-7798. doi:
10.1109/4234.922758.
[51] 3GPP. 3GPP TR 36.814. 2017. url: http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/
36_series/36.814/ (visited on 10/30/2018).
[52] Saleh Faruque. “Radio Frequency Propagation Made Easy”. In: 2015. isbn:
978-3-319-11394-4. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-11394-4.
[53] Simon R. Saunders. “Antennas adn Propagation for Wireless Communication
System”. In: 2007. isbn: 978-0-470-84879-1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 57
[54] WPEQ-353ACNI. Sparklan, WPEQ-353ACNI product datasheet. 2018. url:
http://www.sparklan.com/p3-filedown.php?PKey=0f67jlIx4YYfwB9gV5s606k%
5C2%CC%891sUoMLFgttsc2r_rNA (visited on 10/05/2018).
[55] Delock WLAN 802.11 ac/a/h/b/g/n Antenna RP-SMA plug 5 - 7 dBi omni-
directional with tilt joint black. Delock, datasheet. 2018. url: https://www.
delock.com/produkt/88899/pdf.html?sprache=en (visited on 10/31/2018).
[56] Eman Abdelfattah. “Performance Evaluation of TCP Congestion Control
Mechanisms”. In: Novel Algorithms and Techniques in Telecommunications
and Networking. Ed. by Tarek Sobh, Khaled Elleithy, and Ausif Mahmood.
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010, pp. 251–256. isbn: 978-90-481-3662-9.
[57] Olaf Titz. Why TCP Over TCP Is A Bad Idea. 2001. url: http://sites.inka.
de/bigred/devel/tcp-tcp.html (visited on 10/22/2018).
[58] About rfkill. About rfkill. 2015. url: https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/users/
documentation/rfkill (visited on 10/26/2018).
